On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to 
> Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get 
> this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated 
> assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given 
> definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that 
> Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory 
> within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it 
> anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since 
> the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness 
> actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. 
> Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that 
> implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are 
> derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism 
> would be reckless to say the least.
> *Step one* talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with 
> ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials 
> or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal 
> machine would be sufficient.
> That is step 6.

I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the 
teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from 1.

> Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a 
> trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to 
> each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively 
> result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as 
> a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and 
> speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied 
> person come in?
> As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the 
> brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with 
> consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we 
> associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the overall 
effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or does it gradually 
constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected effort-ness?

> Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role 
> this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like 
> teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is 
> duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent 
> a duplicate, not teleported the original.
> Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the 
> original. That's step 5, precisely.
> You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for 
> you is in the assumption.

Yes, the assumption seems to presume physicality to disprove physicality 
and presume consciousness to explain consciousness. Computation seems to 
have nothing to do with either one of them in comp other than the fact of 
the plasticity and aloofness of comp can be seen as a sign that it is 
neither mind nor matter. It still doesn't answer the question of why have 
appearances of mind or matter at all? If there is a reason, then that 
reason is the nature of the cosmos, not the filing and organizing system 
that indexes it's activities.

> I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
> *yes, doctor*: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the 
> entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain 
> function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of 
> non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is 
> a universal commodity.
> Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can 
> be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.

It can't ask for anything by itself though. We are the ones to whom the 
significance relates. Information is nothing but an experience that can be 
remembered and transmitted to other experiencers through formation.

> *Church thesis*: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of 
> resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is 
> a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from 
> the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter 
> or exit a computation?
> It is a discovery by mathematicians. 

And it is a valid discovery in the context of mathematical theory, but it 
doesn't translate to the realism of subjectivity and physics. It assumes 
weightless computation that generates weight (for not particular reason).

> *Arithmetical Realism*: The idea that truth values are self justifying 
> independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. 
> Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the 
> beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic 
> constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. 
> Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward 
> arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?
> They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness 
> makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is 
> different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove 
> it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon 
> enough".
> Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and 
> numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.

I admit that I have only a wisp of understanding about modal logic and 
Gödelian-Löbianian ideas, but I feel like even this surface understanding 
is enough to tell me that it is ultimately a red herring. These concepts 
seem to just be about self-reference - maps of maps with no territory. 
Great for simulating some aspects of thought, because indeed, thinking has 
to do with copying copies and intellectual grammar, but feeling doesn't. 
These are ways of mentioning how ideas are mentioned. In reality, this 
sentence does not refer to itself. There are only characters, or pixels, or 
optical phenomena here. The significance does not arise from the same level 
in which it is transmitted. This is the Chinese Room. Ceci n'est pas une 


> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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