On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a set
> of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause
> consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like
> anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not the
> effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it can be
> enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the
> experience that is your own.
No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that
if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something
like what you are saying is right.
>>> > This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all
>>> > forms of
>>> > measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever being
>>> > a
>>> > such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person behaviors of
>>> > any
>>> > system.
>>> > What is it that you don't think I understand?
>>> What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of
>>> behaviours is not required.
>> Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous
>> system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person who is
>> using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be exhaustive
>> enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it
>> biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until someone
>> can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then walked
>> back on.
>> The replacement components need only be within the engineering tolerance
>> of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is
>> achievable in principle.
> You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly why
> it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping out
> your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long as it
> was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion.
> Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals
> with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could be
> no consciousness.
Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that!
>> I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have
>> been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their
>> behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up even
>> tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the function
>> of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean the
>> consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since otherwise we
>> would have the possibility of a person having radically different
>> experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their experiences
>> were different.
> The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves
> just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the menu.
And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the
experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a
partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and
doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that
this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning?
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