On Monday, September 17, 2012 11:02:16 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > On Tue, Sep 18, 2012 at 6:39 AM, Craig Weinberg > <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> > wrote: > > > I understand that, but it still assumes that there is a such thing as a > set > > of functions which could be identified and reproduced that cause > > consciousness. I don't assume that, because consciousness isn't like > > anything else. It is the source of all functions and appearances, not > the > > effect of them. Once you have consciousness in the universe, then it can > be > > enhanced and altered in infinite ways, but none of them can replace the > > experience that is your own. > > No, the paper does *not* assume that there is a set of functions that > if reproduced will will cause consciousness. It assumes that something > like what you are saying is right. >
By assume I mean the implicit assumptions which are unstated in the paper. The thought experiment comes out of a paradox arising from assumptions about qualia and the brain which are both false in my view. I see the brain as the flattened qualia of human experience. > > >>> > This is the point of the thought experiment. The limitations of all > >>> > forms of > >>> > measurement and perception preclude all possibility of there ever > being > >>> > a > >>> > such thing as an exhaustively complete set of third person behaviors > of > >>> > any > >>> > system. > >>> > > >>> > What is it that you don't think I understand? > >>> > >>> What you don't understand is that an exhaustively complete set of > >>> behaviours is not required. > >> > >> > >> Yes, it is. Not for prosthetic enhancements, or repairs to a nervous > >> system, but to replace a nervous system without replacing the person > who is > >> using it, yes, there is no set of behaviors which can ever be > exhaustive > >> enough in theory to accomplish that. You might be able to do it > >> biologically, but there is no reason to trust it unless and until > someone > >> can be walked off of their brain for a few weeks or months and then > walked > >> back on. > >> > >> > >> The replacement components need only be within the engineering > tolerance > >> of the nervous system components. This is a difficult task but it is > >> achievable in principle. > > > > > > You assume that consciousness can be replaced, but I understand exactly > why > > it can't. You can believe that there is no difference between scooping > out > > your brain stem and replacing it with a functional equivalent as long as > it > > was well engineered, but to me it's a completely misguided notion. > > Consciousness doesn't exist on the outside of us. Engineering only deals > > with exteriors. If the universe were designed by engineers, there could > be > > no consciousness. > > Yes, that is exactly what the paper assumes. Exactly that! > It still is modeling the experience of qualia as having a quantitative relation with the ratio of brain to non-brain. That isn't the only way to model it, and I use a different model. > > >> I assume that my friends have not been replaced by robots. If they have > >> been then that means the robots can almost perfectly replicate their > >> behaviour, since I (and people in general) am very good at picking up > even > >> tiny deviations from normal behaviour. The question then is, if the > function > >> of a human can be replicated this closely by a machine does that mean > the > >> consciousness can also be replicated? The answer is yes, since > otherwise we > >> would have the possibility of a person having radically different > >> experiences but behaving normally and being unaware that their > experiences > >> were different. > > > > > > The answer is no. A cartoon of Bugs Bunny has no experiences but behaves > > just like Bugs Bunny would if he had experiences. You are eating the > menu. > > And if it were possible to replicate the behaviour without the > experiences - i.e. make a zombie - it would be possible to make a > partial zombie, which lacks some experiences but behaves normally and > doesn't realise that it lacks those experiences. Do you agree that > this is the implication? If not, where is the flaw in the reasoning? > The word zombie implies that you have an expectation of consciousness but there isn't any. That is a fallacy from the start, since there is not reason to expect a simulation to have any experience at all. It's not a zombie, it's a puppet. A partial zombie is just someone who has brain damage, and yes if you tried to replace enough of a person's brain with a non-biological material, you would get brain damage, dementia, coma, and death. Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/nrqkIqoR6xMJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
