On 9/21/2012 4:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 20 Sep 2012, at 21:46, Stephen P. King wrote:
snip
Dear Bruno,
Did you mean "both the 3p-self and the non-nameable 1p-self"? How
does the 1p-self name itself?
It cannot. In logic "name" is for definite description. The 3-self can
name itself (due to the existence of solution to phi_x(y) = x), but
the 1-self cannot know who he is, and can only give relative pointers,
not a description/name.
Dear Bruno,
A bisimulation between us is occurring! Finally, some progress!
I am considering 'particular physical systems" as "relative names"
of instances of universal computations.
Can the the non-nameable 1p-self be approximately named with an
integration of an uncountable set of names?
Yes. It is a sort of equivalent of a relativistic diabolo.
Please elaborate! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diabolo Interesting!
"the devil on two sticks". This fits nicely with my thinking of Pratt's
idea!
You can associate to an 1p-instant, its computational state, and all
computations going through it. Of course the 1p itself is not such a
structure, as it is not a structure in any 3p sense.
Right. it is an illusion. But it is the illusion of "something".
Dreams = illusions.
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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