On 9/21/2012 4:34 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Sep 2012, at 21:46, Stephen P. King wrote:


Dear Bruno,

Did you mean "both the 3p-self and the non-nameable 1p-self"? How does the 1p-self name itself?

It cannot. In logic "name" is for definite description. The 3-self can name itself (due to the existence of solution to phi_x(y) = x), but the 1-self cannot know who he is, and can only give relative pointers, not a description/name.

Dear Bruno,

    A bisimulation between us is occurring! Finally, some progress!

I am considering 'particular physical systems" as "relative names" of instances of universal computations.

Can the the non-nameable 1p-self be approximately named with an integration of an uncountable set of names?

Yes. It is a sort of equivalent of a relativistic diabolo.

Please elaborate! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diabolo Interesting! "the devil on two sticks". This fits nicely with my thinking of Pratt's idea!

You can associate to an 1p-instant, its computational state, and all computations going through it. Of course the 1p itself is not such a structure, as it is not a structure in any 3p sense.

Right. it is an illusion. But it is the illusion of "something". Dreams = illusions.




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