On 9/20/2012 10:04 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 20, 2012 9:49:58 PM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote:

    On 9/20/2012 12:55 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Thursday, September 20, 2012 7:19:30 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote:

        Hi Craig Weinberg
        Consciousness requires an autonomous self.

    Human consciousness requires an autonomous human self, but it is
    not necessarily true that consciousness requires a 'self'. It
    makes more sense to say that an autonomous self and consciousness
    both require awareness.

        What if awareness is what happens when autonomous self and
    consciousness mirror each other?

There can't be an autonomous self without awareness as an ontological given to begin with, at least as an inevitable potential.

I take that as a good starting point, but I am just sticking my head into a stream. That is "God", btw. ;-)

What would a self be or do without awareness?

    Not a thing!

You can have awareness without a self being presented within that awareness though. I've had dreams where there is no "I" there are just scenes that are taking place.

And those scenes go without meaning... Reminds me of a scene from Macbeth...

        So does life itself. And intelligence.

    We don't really know that. We can only speak for our own life and
    our own intelligence. I wouldn't presume a self, especially on
    low levels of awareness like molecular groupings.

        So, I hagte to say this, but perhaps consciousness and life
        may be a
        problem with mereology, don't know.

    Why is it a problem. Mereology is the public presentation of
    life, and the private presentation is the opposite: non-mereology.

        Huh? non-mereology. What is that?

I call it a-mereology also. That's the subjective conjugate to topology. In public realism there is the Stone Duality ( topologies┴ logical algebras) while the private phenomenology duality is orthogonal to the Stone (a-mereology ┴ transrational gestalt-algebra).

    Mereology is the study of relations between "wholes" and "parts"....

I posted about it a bit yesterday:

    Our feeling of hurting is a (whole) experience of human reality,
    so that it is not composed of sub-personal experiences in a
    part-whole mereological relation but rather the relation is just
    the opposite. It is non-mereological or a-mereological. It is the
    primordial semi-unity/hyper-unity from which part-whole
    distinctions are extracted and projected outward as classical
    realism of an exterior world. I know that sounds dense and crazy,
    but I don’t know of a clearer way to describe it. Subjective
    experience is augmented along an axis of quality rather than
    quantity. Experiences of hurting capitulate sub personal
    experiences of emotional loss and disappointment, anger, and fear,
    with tactile sensations of throbbing, stabbing, burning, and
    cognitive feedback loops of worry, impatience, exaggerating and
    replaying the injury or illness, memories of associated
    experiences, etc. But we can just say ‘hurting’ and we all know
    generally what that means. No more particular description adds
    much to it. That is completely unlike exterior realism, where all
    we can see of a machine hurting would be that more processing
    power would seem to be devoted to some particular set of
    computations. They don’t run ‘all together and at once’, unless
    there is a living being who is there to interpret it that way - as
    we do when we look at a screen full of individual pixels and see
images through the pixels rather than the changing pixels themselves.






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