On 9/25/2012 8:26 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King
I don't deny that a computer can optimize itself,
but I deny that the operation is autonomous,
meaning independent, for ultimately it is software
dependent, using a program written by an outsider.
Please think a while about that "independence" means here. How
could you even know of the existence of a think that is completely
independent of you? Autonomy, independence, etc. are "relative" terms in
the sense that there is always an implied "ideal" condition and/or
context that we can define them and all of their "weakened" versions.
True intelligence and true consciousness must be
to whatever extent possible independent of outside
help or perspective.
Sure, but is that even possible given the necessary requirements of
consciousness? Does consciousness need to have as its object more than
just itself? How does even a "consistent solipsist" know that it exists?
Isn't the self 1p ? not sure.
The self is 1p, by definition.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Time: 2012-09-24, 10:39:14
Subject: Re: questions on machines, belief, awareness, and knowledge
On 9/24/2012 9:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
The computer can mechanically prove something,
but it cannot know that it did so. It cannot
sit back with a beer and muse over how smart it is.
What you are considering that a computer does not have is the
ability to model itself within its environment and compute optimizations
of such a model to guide its future choices. This can be well
represented within a computational framework and it is something that
Bruno has worked out in his comp model. (My only beef with Bruno is that
his model is so abstract that it is completely disconnected from the
physical world and thus has a "body" problem.)
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