On 10/5/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,
Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that
sense Craig is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not.
They avoid the comp necessary reformulation of the mind-body problem.
It is still Aristotle theory variants, unaware of the first person
indeterminacy.
It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non trivial
derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.
Bruno
Hi Bruno,
Yes, Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp,
because comp, as currently formulated only "understands" the other
aspect as "a body problem". I disagree that they are "unaware of 1p
indeterminacy"; they just ignore the idea that there is just one mind
that has an infinite number of instances of a body. The "non-trivial
derivation" is necessary for obvious reasons. If a fact is trivial, how
does it have any "reach" to explain any relations beyond itself?
"Conspiracy of numbers"? Absolutely! But this is true in comp
already. Consider Bp&p; given the universe of propositions, how many are
true and mutually non-contradictory?
--
Onward!
Stephen
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