On 10/5/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,

Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that sense Craig is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not. They avoid the comp necessary reformulation of the mind-body problem. It is still Aristotle theory variants, unaware of the first person indeterminacy. It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non trivial derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.


 Hi Bruno,

Yes, Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp, because comp, as currently formulated only "understands" the other aspect as "a body problem". I disagree that they are "unaware of 1p indeterminacy"; they just ignore the idea that there is just one mind that has an infinite number of instances of a body. The "non-trivial derivation" is necessary for obvious reasons. If a fact is trivial, how does it have any "reach" to explain any relations beyond itself? "Conspiracy of numbers"? Absolutely! But this is true in comp already. Consider Bp&p; given the universe of propositions, how many are true and mutually non-contradictory?



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