Hi Roger Clough,

On 06 Oct 2012, at 12:46, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I understand that comp does not include subjectivity,
but that's just explicitly.

?

Comp is defined by the invariance of subjectivity for some transforms, so it includes subjectivity at the start. And, in the conclusion, it gives to subjectivity and consciousness the quasi primary goal for everything, except the numbers that we, and all scientists, have to postulate initially.

I have no clue why you think that comp does not include subjectivity. Comp is the theological believe in the possibility in a form of technological reincarnation. This assumes subjectivity and persons in an important way.

The consequence is that you survive anyway, and that "dying" is no more logically possible or even meaningfull, but that is in the consequence. I don't know if it is true, but the whole theory (comp) is testable, as physics is entirely retrievable in comp (and up to now, it gives the correct quantum logic).




Perhaps something can be made of the
results, like extract energy (structure, which I take to be an
essential of consciousness) from the results. Hmmm.
That would be a numerical caclulation.  Could you be wrong ?

Sure. Comp can be wrong, and my argument can be wrong too, but then the argument is precise enough so that you if you assert that it is wrong, you have to find where (if enough polite 'course).


Perhaps mind, like Maxwell's Demon, "makes sense of"
raw experience. Finds structure or whatever. That's
called Secondness.


Yes. That is what all universal systems do all the "time", almost everywhere, in arithmetic. They build sense from patterns, in a variated inexhaustible number of manner, and this by "participating" simultaneously to infinities of computations (that is special number relations).


I wonder if something like this, used as a (Secondness) filter on the (Firstness)
output of comp , could provide (Thirdness) structured consciousness.

It is not entirely meaningless, but it still assumes Aristotle, and does not really approach the question in philosophy of mind/matter. It assumes the basic Aristotelian metaphysics which I argue to be logically incompatible with comp.

There is not output to comp, as comp is not a program or a machine, but a theory, which just postulates that your subjective life is invariant for a a digital change made at some description level of your brain or body. The consequence is that the brain and your body are emergent relative patterns in arithmetic. It makes the whole physics a branch of the theology of numbers, itself part of arithmetic.

Comp is just the assumption that we are machine. It is the favorite hypothesis of the materialist, which are understandably not happy with the result which is that comp is incompatible with even very weak version of materialism (the belief in the existence of Matter or primary matter and that is a relation with the matter we can observe).

COMP+ WEAK-MATERIALISM ======> 0 = 1.

To be sure, COMP is still compatible, logically, with the existence of primary matter as an epinoumenon (that is a Matter not related to anything we can subjectively observe).

Assuming comp things should be like that:

NUMBER ===> CONSCIOUSNESS ====> MATTER

IMHO mind is constructive mathematics,
creating meaningful structures from raw experience.

That intuition is confirmed by the math of comp + the classical theory of knowledge (Plato, Theaetetus, ...): the third hypostase (Bp & p) describe a constructivist intuitionist subject close to Brouwer theory of consciousness. Indeed. Like the logic of matter justifies quantum logic (without assuming anything physical).

Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/6/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-05, 11:13:06
Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice video discussingthe dual aspect theory


Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,

Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that
sense Craig is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not.
They avoid the comp necessary reformulation of the mind-body problem.
It is still Aristotle theory variants, unaware of the first person
indeterminacy.
It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non trivial
derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.

Bruno


On 05 Oct 2012, at 13:15, Richard Ruquist wrote:

Along the theme of a dual-aspect theory of reality,
I recommend the book
"Mind and Cosmos:Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of
Nature Is Almost Certainly False" by Nagel, Thomas.
It actually has little to do with Darwin but rather discusses how
consciousness, cognition, etc. cannot not be explained by materialism.
Richard


On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:02 AM, Roger Clough
wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King

Many thanks, Stephan !

I should have known it before, but
double-aspect and/or dual-aspect theories
of mind aren't afraid of using the word
"subjectivity".

Now all they have to do is find out
who or what is the subjectr of subjectivity !




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/5/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Stephen P. King
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-04, 09:14:20
Subject: A nice video discussing the dual aspect theory


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZ3Z-Y99wW0

--
Onward!

Stephen


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