On 05 Oct 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/5/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,
Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that
sense Craig is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not.
They avoid the comp necessary reformulation of the mind-body
problem. It is still Aristotle theory variants, unaware of the
first person indeterminacy.
It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non
trivial derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.
Bruno
Hi Bruno,
Yes, Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp,
because comp, as currently formulated
What do you mean by this. Comp is just a precise version of mechanism
("yes doctor", + Church thesis).
only "understands" the other aspect as "a body problem".
That's the result.
I disagree that they are "unaware of 1p indeterminacy";
?
they just ignore the idea that there is just one mind that has an
infinite number of instances of a body.
You mean: all person have an infinity of relative incarnation in
arithmetic. This is not entirely trivial to prove. You can't attribute
to people statements they don't make. If they did not ignore the 1p-
indeterminacy, they would not assume matter.
The "non-trivial derivation" is necessary for obvious reasons.
?
If a fact is trivial, how does it have any "reach" to explain any
relations beyond itself?
Trivial?
"Conspiracy of numbers"? Absolutely! But this is true in comp
already.
?
Consider Bp&p; given the universe of propositions, how many are true
and mutually non-contradictory?
?
The notion of contradiction needs theories. The notion of truth needs
semantics (models).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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