Hi Bruno Marchal
IMHO mind is constructive mathematics,
creating meaningful structures from raw experience.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Time: 2012-10-06, 04:39:30
Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word!
On 06 Oct 2012, at 09:52, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/6/2012 3:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Oct 2012, at 19:39, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 10/5/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,
Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that sense Craig
is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not. They avoid the comp
necessary reformulation of the mind-body problem. It is still Aristotle theory
variants, unaware of the first person indeterminacy.
It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non trivial
derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.
Yes, Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp, because
comp, as currently formulated
What do you mean by this. Comp is just a precise version of mechanism ("yes
doctor", + Church thesis).
I don't think so. There is more to comp than that! You have to appeal to
the universe of arithmetic structures and Sigma_1 to build your hypostaces, no?
No. It is contained in Church thesis. Church thesis assumed elementary
arithmetic (and thus the Sigma_1, etc.).
only "understands" the other aspect as "a body problem".
That's the result.
Right. Not the singular form!
Well it is a sequence of result. 1p-indeterminacy, non-locality, non cloning,
reduction of the mind-body problem to an arithmetical body problem, theory of
quanta as part of a theory of qualia, etc. Just read the papers, as my answer
can only point on what has already be done.
I disagree that they are "unaware of 1p indeterminacy";
They assume a plurality of 1p by assuming many bodies = many minds.
The assumption have been made clear. None of what you say is assumed.
they just ignore the idea that there is just one mind that has an infinite
number of instances of a body.
You mean: all person have an infinity of relative incarnation in arithmetic.
This is not entirely trivial to prove.
Why? I just postulate that I cannot be a consistent solipsist.
You can't attribute to people statements they don't make. If they did not
ignore the 1p-indeterminacy, they would not assume matter.
How else can it be proven that the infinity of relative incarnations
It is an elementary consequence of comp. All the existence of universal numbers
is a consequence of arithmetical truth. (Of course all arithmetical theory will
miss some of such existence, but they still exist in arithmetical truth which
is beyond all theories).
You prove it by demonstration via the copy and paste operations.
Do you think that this is the only method of generating a plurality of minds?
See my answer to Clark. I have already explain this.
The "non-trivial derivation" is necessary for obvious reasons.
If a fact is trivial, how does it have any "reach" to explain any relations
I misread your original sentence.
"Conspiracy of numbers"? Absolutely! But this is true in comp already.
Does not your question of a measure assume the equivalent of a conspiracy
Why? Not at all.
Are you talking literally about numbers????
Yes. 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... With the laws
x + 0 = x
x + s(y) = s(x + y)
x *0 = 0
x*s(y) = x*y + x
And nothing else (except for some logic sugar), and the comp assumption.
Consider Bp&p; given the universe of propositions, how many are true and
The notion of contradiction needs theories. The notion of truth needs semantics
Yeah, you might study some semiotic theory! The problem of the signified
or "meaning" in Semiotics is a nice study of your ideas of Platonism...
This video http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdP_dtBvtQo in Spanish is nice, not
sure if you known Spanish....
Make your point, please.
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