Hi Roger Clough,

Hi Bruno Marchal

1) That's not subjectivity. That's objectivity. Wrong perspective. Subjectivity is the view from within, looking out, not the view from outside objectively looking in. 1p does refer to a particular person, although indeterminately, but from outside, objectively.

What do you mean by that? I think you confuse the third person point of view on some first person view, like when we attribute consciousness to some other, with the consciousness of the subject itself. The first person indeterminacy needs the second of those option, and corresponds to what you call the subjectivity. Then the math shows that such subjectivity has no objective correspondent, making it irreducibibly subjective.

When you say yes to the doctor, it is NOT because the doctor will make a working copy of you, it is because YOU believe that YOU will subjectively survive in the usual sense.

If that is not clear at step 0, 1 or even 2, it has to be cleared up at the step 3 in the sane04 paper, to get the first person indeterminacy.

Please read this carefully, you were far too quick. Tell me when you understand the step 3, which is the step proving the existence of a necessary subjective indeterminacy, in a purely objective and determinate setting, once we assume comp.

I found and published this more than 30 years ago, and got a price for that a bit later, but it is still ignored, a bit like Everett in QM (which use a similar idea). All the UDA reversal between physics and number theology is built on that notion.

Bruno






sub┬Ějec┬Ětive (sb-jktv)
adj.

1.
a. Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision.
b. Particular to a given person; personal: subjective experience.
2. Moodily introspective....
1a means that the issue does not take place in the external world, it takes place inside a person's mind.
1b means that the issue is personal, not publicly available.

2) Were the physical laws there before the universe was created ?

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/7/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-06, 15:19:35
Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice videodiscussingthedual aspect theory


Hi Roger Clough,


On 06 Oct 2012, at 16:47, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal


How does comp include subjectivity ?



As I said, comp is a bet on a form of reincarnation, as you accept to change your body for a new (digital) one. Comp, by definition, at least the one I gave, is the bet that your subjectivity is invariant for some change made in the local universe.


It presupposes subjectivity at the start. You might read:


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html




Hi Stathis Papaioannou

Don't avoid my question please.
Where do the laws of physics come from ?


I will answer this, of course Stathis can comment.


The laws of physics comes from the arithmetical truth, actually a tiny part of it. They are the way the intensional or relative universal numbers see themselves in a persistent (symmetrical, with probability close to one) manner. Physics is what stabilize consciousness in the number realm. The details on this are what we are aligned on, so I refer to the posts, and to the paper above to see the link with comp and arithmetic).
But you can ask question (I cannot sum up the thing in one sentence).


You must get the technical point that arithmetical truth emulates all computations. Then everything follows from comp, the dreams, and the indeterminacy on them.


Bruno





Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
10/6/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-10-06, 08:48:04
Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice video discussingthedual aspect theory


Hi Roger Clough,


On 06 Oct 2012, at 12:46, Roger Clough wrote:


Hi Bruno Marchal



I understand that comp does not include subjectivity,

but that's just explicitly.


?

Comp is defined by the invariance of subjectivity for some transforms,
so it includes subjectivity at the start.
And, in the conclusion, it gives to subjectivity and consciousness the
quasi primary goal for everything, except the numbers that we, and all
scientists, have to postulate initially.

I have no clue why you think that comp does not include subjectivity.
Comp is the theological believe in the possibility in a form of
technological reincarnation. This assumes subjectivity and persons in
an important way.

The consequence is that you survive anyway, and that "dying" is no
more logically possible or even meaningfull, but that is in the
consequence. I don't know if it is true, but the whole theory (comp)
is testable, as physics is entirely retrievable in comp (and up to
now, it gives the correct quantum logic).





Perhaps something can be made of the

results, like extract energy (structure, which I take to be an

essential of consciousness) from the results. Hmmm.

That would be a numerical caclulation. Could you be wrong ?


Sure. Comp can be wrong, and my argument can be wrong too, but then
the argument is precise enough so that you if you assert that it is
wrong, you have to find where (if enough polite 'course).



Perhaps mind, like Maxwell's Demon, "makes sense of"

raw experience. Finds structure or whatever. That's

called Secondness.



Yes. That is what all universal systems do all the "time", almost
everywhere, in arithmetic. They build sense from patterns, in a
variated inexhaustible number of manner, and this by "participating"
simultaneously to infinities of computations (that is special number
relations).



I wonder if something like this, used as a (Secondness) filter on

the (Firstness)

output of comp , could provide (Thirdness) structured consciousness.


It is not entirely meaningless, but it still assumes Aristotle, and
does not really approach the question in philosophy of mind/matter. It
assumes the basic Aristotelian metaphysics which I argue to be
logically incompatible with comp.

There is not output to comp, as comp is not a program or a machine,
but a theory, which just postulates that your subjective life is
invariant for a a digital change made at some description level of
your brain or body. The consequence is that the brain and your body
are emergent relative patterns in arithmetic. It makes the whole
physics a branch of the theology of numbers, itself part of arithmetic.

Comp is just the assumption that we are machine. It is the favorite
hypothesis of the materialist, which are understandably not happy with
the result which is that comp is incompatible with even very weak
version of materialism (the belief in the existence of Matter or
primary matter and that is a relation with the matter we can observe).

COMP+ WEAK-MATERIALISM ======> 0 = 1.

To be sure, COMP is still compatible, logically, with the existence of
primary matter as an epinoumenon (that is a Matter not related to
anything we can subjectively observe).

Assuming comp things should be like that:

NUMBER ===> CONSCIOUSNESS ====> MATTER


IMHO mind is constructive mathematics,

creating meaningful structures from raw experience.


That intuition is confirmed by the math of comp + the classical theory
of knowledge (Plato, Theaetetus, ...): the third hypostase (Bp & p)
describe a constructivist intuitionist subject close to Brouwer theory
of consciousness. Indeed. Like the logic of matter justifies quantum
logic (without assuming anything physical).

Bruno








Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

10/6/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen





----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Bruno Marchal

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-05, 11:13:06

Subject: Re: Subjectivity is no longer a dirty word! A nice video

discussingthe dual aspect theory





Hi Richard, Stephen, Roger,



Dual aspect theories are plausibly incompatible with comp. In that

sense Craig is more coherent, but Stephen, and Chalmers, seems not.

They avoid the comp necessary reformulation of the mind-body problem.

It is still Aristotle theory variants, unaware of the first person

indeterminacy.

It might be compatible with comp, but then this asks for a non trivial

derivation, and some conspiracy of the numbers.



Bruno





On 05 Oct 2012, at 13:15, Richard Ruquist wrote:



Along the theme of a dual-aspect theory of reality,

I recommend the book

"Mind and Cosmos:Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of

Nature Is Almost Certainly False" by Nagel, Thomas.

It actually has little to do with Darwin but rather discusses how

consciousness, cognition, etc. cannot not be explained by

materialism.

Richard





On Fri, Oct 5, 2012 at 6:02 AM, Roger Clough

wrote:

Hi Stephen P. King



Many thanks, Stephan !



I should have known it before, but

double-aspect and/or dual-aspect theories

of mind aren't afraid of using the word

"subjectivity".



Now all they have to do is find out

who or what is the subjectr of subjectivity !









Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net

10/5/2012

"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen





----- Receiving the following content -----

From: Stephen P. King

Receiver: everything-list

Time: 2012-10-04, 09:14:20

Subject: A nice video discussing the dual aspect theory





http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZ3Z-Y99wW0



--
Onward!



Stephen





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