Roger,
I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos.
He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory,
Max Green is.
His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra
dimensions of string theory.
Richard


On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough <[email protected]> wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
> The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics
> on space (same as that of Leibniz)  would be to watch
>
> NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of 
> sgtring theory)
>
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main
>
>
> or go to
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity
>
>
> Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include:
>
>    " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of 
> observers. In particular, space and time can dilate.
>     Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation 
> to each other.
>     The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers."
>
> or
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space
>
>
> "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a 
> central issue in epistemology and metaphysics.
> At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and 
> Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician,
> set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity 
> that independently
> exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than 
> the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world
> "space is that which results from places taken together".[5] Unoccupied 
> regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations 
> with other places.
> For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations 
> between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could 
> not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a 
> similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the 
> family are related to one another,
> the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued 
> that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that 
> implies a difference between
> two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in 
> each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these
> universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there 
> would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of 
> sufficient reason,
> any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible 
> universes, must therefore be wrong.[8]
>
> Roger Clough, [email protected]
> 10/11/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Craig Weinberg
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17
> Subject: Re: Impossible connections
>
>
> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that 
> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his 
> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or 
> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, 
> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of 
> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public 
> bodies.
>
> Craig
>
> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where 
> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but 
> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks.
>
> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is.
> Richard
>
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough  wrote:
>> Hi Richard Ruquist
>>
>> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas.
>> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible
>> between ideas and things.
>>
>>
>> Roger Clough, [email protected]
>> 10/11/2012
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>>
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> From: Richard Ruquist
>> Receiver: everything-list
>> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39
>> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls
>>
>>
>> Craig,
>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons..
>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences.
>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary.
>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that.
>> Names are not important.
>> Richard
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Craig,
>>>>
>>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the
>>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if
>>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then
>>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other.
>>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism.
>>>
>>>
>>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think
>>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as
>>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be
>>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that
>>> doesn't...bleed?
>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29)
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory
>>>> monads..
>>>>
>>>> For example take the binding problem where:
>>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different
>>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single
>>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each
>>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf)
>>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc
>>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space),
>>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for
>>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial
>>>> location"
>>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up:
>>>>
>>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries
>>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually
>>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The
>>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'?
>>>
>>>>
>>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things
>>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection.
>>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory
>>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness
>>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads
>>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem
>>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and
>>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what
>>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human
>>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum
>>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this
>>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble
>>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an
>>> experiencer?
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Richard
>>>>
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