Hi Richard, The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch
NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of sgtring theory) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main or go to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to each other. The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers." or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity that independently exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world "space is that which results from places taken together". Unoccupied regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations with other places. For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could not be continuous but must be discrete. Space could be thought of in a similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the family are related to one another, the relations do not exist independently of the people. Leibniz argued that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that implies a difference between two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of sufficient reason, any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible universes, must therefore be wrong. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/11/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 Subject: Re: Impossible connections I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public bodies. Craig PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. Richard On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi Richard Ruquist > > Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. > The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible > between ideas and things. > > > Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net > 10/11/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Richard Ruquist > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 > Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls > > > Craig, > The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. > I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. > But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. > The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. > Names are not important. > Richard > > > On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >>> >>> Craig, >>> >>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >> >> >> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think >> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as >> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be >> >> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that >> doesn't...bleed? >> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) >> >>> >>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >>> monads.. >>> >>> For example take the binding problem where: >>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >>> location" >>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >>> >>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) >>> >> >> >> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries >> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually >> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The >> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? >> >>> >>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >>> perhaps to solve the binding problem >>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. >> >> >> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and >> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what >> >> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human >> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum >> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this >> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble >> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an >> experiencer? >> >> Craig >> >>> >>> Richard >>> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To view this discussion on the web visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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