Hi Bruno Marchal  

Comp cannot give subjective content, can only provide an
objective simulation on the BEHAVIOR of a person (or his physical brain).
This behavioral information can be dealt with by the 
philosophy of mind called "functionalism":

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/

"Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes 
something a mental 
state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but 
rather on the way 
it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This 
doctrine is rooted in 
Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception 
of the mind as 
a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly 
endorsed) only in 
the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to 
designate a variety 
of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, 
sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on 
functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states."

A criticism of functionalism and hence of comp is that if one only
considers his physical behavior (and possibily but not necessarily his brain's 
behavior),  
a person can behave in a certain way but have a different mental content.




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/20/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-19, 03:31:54 
Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" ratherthan"is" 




On 17 Oct 2012, at 15:28, Stephen P. King wrote: 


On 10/17/2012 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:00, Stephen P. King wrote:  


On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:  

On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:  



There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a simulation but that 
is more controversial.  

A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of?  


    We can close this by considering when is a simulation of a "real thing" 
indistinguishable from the "real thing"!  


What law states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity to 
experience and participate in a simulated world does not?  


    Good point! Why not both existing ab initio?  


But they exists ab initio in the arithmetical truth. So with comp, we can 
postulate only the numbers, or the computations (they are ontologically 
equivalent), then consciousness is semantical fixed point, existing for 
arithmetical reason, yet not describable in direct arithmetical term (like 
truth, by Tarski, or knowledge by Scott-Montague. The Theaetetical "Bp & p" is 
very appealing in that setting, as it is not arithmetically definable, yet 
makes sense in purely arithmetical term for each p in the language of the 
machine (arithmetic, say).  

So we don't have to postulate consciousness to explain why machine will 
correctly believe in, and develop discourse about, some truth that they can 
know, and that they can also know them to be non justifiable, non sharable, and 
possibly invariant for digital self-transformation, etc.  

Bruno  


Hi Bruno, 

    We seem to have a fundamental disagreement on what constitutes "arithmetic 
truth". In my thinking, the truth value of a proposition is not separable from 
the ability to evaluate the proposition 


I agree for mundane truth, but not for the truth we can accept to built a 
fundamental theory. 


If you accept comp, you know that the ability to evaluate a proposition will be 
explained in term of a functioning machine, and this is build on elementary 
arithmetical truth. So, with comp, you statement would make comp circular. 


Bruno 








(as Jaakko Hintikka considers) and thus is not some Platonic form that has some 
ontological weight in an eternal "pre-established harmony" way. I do not 
believe that our reality is merely some pre-defined program since I am claiming 
that the "pre-definition" is an NP-Hard problem that must be solved prior to 
its use.  
    The best fit for me is an infinity of 1p, each that is a bundle of infinite 
computations, that eternally interact with each other (via bisimulation) and 
not some frozen and pre-existing Being. My philosophy is based on that of 
Heraclitus and not that of Parmenides. Being is defined in my thinking as the 
automorphisms within Becoming, thus what is stable and fixed is just those 
things that relatively do not change within an eternally evolving Universe. 


--  
Onward! 

Stephen 


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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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