On 20 Oct 2012, at 13:35, Roger Clough wrote: (previously) > Hi Bruno Marchal > > Comp cannot give subjective content,
BRUNO: This is equivalent to saying that comp is false. By definition of comp, our consciousness remains intact when we get the right computer, featuring the brain at a genuine description level. Then the math confirms this, even in the ideal case of the arithmetically sound machine, and this by using the most classical definition of belief, knowledge, etc. ROGER: The problem is that the since a computer cannot experience anything (having no 1p) it cannot generate descriptions (3p) of experiences. Or the inverse, to produce experiences (1p) from descriptions (3p) of them. Computers are imprisoned in a 3p world. (previously) > can only provide an > objective simulation on the BEHAVIOR of a person (or his physical > brain). > This behavioral information can be dealt with by the > philosophy of mind called "functionalism": > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/ BRUNO: Here you defend a reductionist conception of what machines and numbers are. It fails already at 3p level, by the incompleteness phenomena. (functionalism is an older version of comp, with the substitution level made implicit, and usually fixed at the neuronal level for the brain, and in that sense comp is a weaker hypothesis than functionalism, as it does not bound the comp subst. level. ROGER: Perhaps, but if I were a brain theorist, I might withhold judgment, as incompleteness might not spoil everything, and my personal attitude is to leave whatever cards you can play still on the table. Sometimes you can solve (to some degree of satisfaction) a mystery with an incomplete set of evidence. > > "Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what > makes something a mental > state of a particular type does not depend on its internal > constitution, but rather on the way > it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a > part. This doctrine is rooted in > Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's > conception of the mind as > a ?alculating machine?, but it has become fully articulated (and > popularly endorsed) only in > the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ?unctionalism? > is used to designate a variety > of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, > sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses > exclusively on > functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental > states." > > A criticism of functionalism and hence of comp is that if one only > considers his physical behavior (and possibily but not necessarily > his brain's behavior), > a person can behave in a certain way but have a different mental > content. Good point, and this is a motivation for making explicit the existence of the level of substitution explicit in the definition. To survive *for a long time* I would personally ask a correct simulation of the molecular levels of both the neurons and the glial cells in the brain. The UD Argument does NOT depend on the choice of the substitution level, as long you get a finite digital description relatively to a universal number/theory/machine. Bruno > > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/20/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: Bruno Marchal > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-19, 03:31:54 > Subject: Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of "as if" > ratherthan"is" > > > > > On 17 Oct 2012, at 15:28, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/17/2012 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:00, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > > > There is of course the idea that the universe is actually a > simulation but that is more controversial. > > A tempting idea until we question what it is a simulation of? > > > We can close this by considering when is a simulation of a "real > thing" indistinguishable from the "real thing"! > > > What law states that computations exist ab initio, but the capacity > to experience and participate in a simulated world does not? > > > Good point! Why not both existing ab initio? > > > But they exists ab initio in the arithmetical truth. So with comp, > we can postulate only the numbers, or the computations (they are > ontologically equivalent), then consciousness is semantical fixed > point, existing for arithmetical reason, yet not describable in > direct arithmetical term (like truth, by Tarski, or knowledge by > Scott-Montague. The Theaetetical "Bp & p" is very appealing in that > setting, as it is not arithmetically definable, yet makes sense in > purely arithmetical term for each p in the language of the machine > (arithmetic, say). > > So we don't have to postulate consciousness to explain why machine > will correctly believe in, and develop discourse about, some truth > that they can know, and that they can also know them to be non > justifiable, non sharable, and possibly invariant for digital self- > transformation, etc. > > Bruno > > > Hi Bruno, > > We seem to have a fundamental disagreement on what constitutes > "arithmetic truth". In my thinking, the truth value of a proposition > is not separable from the ability to evaluate the proposition > > > I agree for mundane truth, but not for the truth we can accept to > built a fundamental theory. > > > If you accept comp, you know that the ability to evaluate a > proposition will be explained in term of a functioning machine, and > this is build on elementary arithmetical truth. So, with comp, you > statement would make comp circular. > > > Bruno > > > > > > > > > (as Jaakko Hintikka considers) and thus is not some Platonic form > that has some ontological weight in an eternal "pre-established > harmony" way. I do not believe that our reality is merely some pre- > defined program since I am claiming that the "pre-definition" is an > NP-Hard problem that must be solved prior to its use. > The best fit for me is an infinity of 1p, each that is a bundle > of infinite computations, that eternally interact with each other > (via bisimulation) and not some frozen and pre-existing Being. My > philosophy is based on that of Heraclitus and not that of > Parmenides. Being is defined in my thinking as the automorphisms > within Becoming, thus what is stable and fixed is just those things > that relatively do not change within an eternally evolving Universe. > > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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