I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
> Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
>
> Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis
> that we cannot
> prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes'
> proposition
> that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism).
>
> If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that
> objects outside
> us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot
> observe the
> passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some
> fixed inextended substrate
> on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only
> necessarily over a small
> duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can
> be made regarding
> space.
>
> Here is an alternate account of that argument:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde
>
> "Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument
> (Dicker 2004, 2008):
>
> 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and
> can be aware,
> that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order.
> (premise)
>
OK
> 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal
> order only if I perceive
> something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
> temporal order. (premise)
What motivates this premise?
>
> 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by
> reference to which
> I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
>
Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise?
> 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to
> which I can
> determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
>
Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have
no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold,
assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid.
> (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having
> experiences that occur in a
> specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space
> outside me by reference
> to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
>
Yes, I can see this follows.
> (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by
> reference to which
> I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)"
>
>
> Roger Clough, [email protected]
> 10/23/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
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