I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed. On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: > Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism > > Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis > that we cannot > prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes' > proposition > that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism). > > If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that > objects outside > us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot > observe the > passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some > fixed inextended substrate > on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only > necessarily over a small > duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can > be made regarding > space. > > Here is an alternate account of that argument: > > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde > > "Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument > (Dicker 2004, 2008): > > 1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and > can be aware, > that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. > (premise) >
OK > 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal > order only if I perceive > something permanent by reference to which I can determine their > temporal order. (premise) What motivates this premise? > > 3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by > reference to which > I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) > Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise? > 4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to > which I can > determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) > Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold, assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid. > (5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having > experiences that occur in a > specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space > outside me by reference > to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise) > Yes, I can see this follows. > (6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by > reference to which > I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)" > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/23/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.