On 10/23/2012 3:20 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
     2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
order only if I perceive
      something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
      temporal order. (premise)
What motivates this premise?
I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in
their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine
computation.  I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between
successive experiences.  This is consistent with the idea that an
experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of
states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.


Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists),

Because otherwise you would only be aware of the passage of time when you consciously remembered and compared two states?

I certainly agree that subconscious thought/information-processing must exist. Conscious thought can only account for a small part of our thinking/awareness. It seems to roughly correspond to what we can put into words or otherwise communicate. That's why I think its appearance was associated with the (cultural) evolution of language.


does not entail the existence of an external world.

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process
information at all).


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to