On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
I have not met this argument before. I have comments interspersed.
On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 08:04:35AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote:
Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism
Problematic Idealism (Berkeley's idealism, not that of Leibniz) is the thesis
that we cannot
prove that objects outside us exist. This results directly from Descartes'
proposition
that the only thing I cannot doubt is that I exist (solipsism).
If solipsism is true, it seems to raise the problem that we cannot prove that
objects outside
us exist . But Kant refutes this thesis by his observation that we cannot
observe the
passing of time (in itself inextended or nonphysical) unless there is some
fixed inextended substrate
on which to observe the change in time. Thus there must exist a fixed (only
necessarily over a small
duration of time) nonphysical substrate to reality. A similar conclusion can
be made regarding
space.
Here is an alternate account of that argument:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-transcendental/#RefIde
"Dicker provides a compelling initial representation of Kant's argument (Dicker
2004, 2008):
1) I am conscious of my own existence in time; that is, I am aware, and
can be aware,
that I have experiences that occur in a specific temporal order. (premise)
OK
2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal
order only if I perceive
something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
temporal order. (premise)
What motivates this premise?
I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in their duration, they
are discrete like states of a Turing machine computation. I'd say we perceive temporal
order by overlap between successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an
experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of states that constitute
the same stream of consciousness.
Brent
3) No conscious state of my own can serve as the permanent entity by
reference to which
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
Even assuming 2), what motivates this premise?
4) Time itself cannot serve as this permanent entity by reference to which
I can
determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
Well, I don't accept an objective concept of time anyway, so I have
no problem with this, although I don't see why this should hold,
assuming an objective (eg Newtonian) concept of time is valid.
(5) If (2), (3), and (4), are true, then I can be aware of having
experiences that occur in a
specific temporal order only if I perceive persisting objects in space
outside me by reference
to which I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (premise)
Yes, I can see this follows.
(6) Therefore, I perceive persisting objects in space outside me by
reference to which
I can determine the temporal order of my experiences. (1?5)"
Roger Clough, [email protected]
10/23/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
