On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >>     2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific 
> >> temporal order only if I perceive
> >>      something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
> >>      temporal order. (premise)
> >What motivates this premise?
> 
> I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in
> their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine
> computation.  I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between
> successive experiences.  This is consistent with the idea that an
> experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of
> states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.
> 
> Brent
> 

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but
does not entail the existence of an external world.

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process
information at all). 

Cheers

-- 

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Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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