On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> >
> >>     2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific 
> >> temporal order only if I perceive
> >>      something permanent by reference to which I can determine their
> >>      temporal order. (premise)
> >What motivates this premise?
> I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in
> their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine
> computation.  I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between
> successive experiences.  This is consistent with the idea that an
> experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of
> states that constitute the same stream of consciousness.
> Brent

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but
does not entail the existence of an external world.

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process
information at all). 



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to