Hi Russell Standish I agree.
Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/24/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-23, 18:20:35 Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > >> 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal > >> order only if I perceive > >> something permanent by reference to which I can determine their > >> temporal order. (premise) > >What motivates this premise? > > I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in > their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine > computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between > successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an > experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of > states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. > > Brent > Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but does not entail the existence of an external world. As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process information at all). Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
