Hi Russell Standish  

I agree. 

Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/24/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Russell Standish  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-23, 18:20:35 
Subject: Re: Kant's Refutation of (Problematic) Idealism 


On Tue, Oct 23, 2012 at 02:47:12PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: 
> On 10/23/2012 2:39 PM, Russell Standish wrote: 
> > 
> >> 2) can be aware of having experiences that occur in a specific temporal 
> >> order only if I perceive 
> >> something permanent by reference to which I can determine their 
> >> temporal order. (premise) 
> >What motivates this premise? 
>  
> I think it is implicitly assuming that experiences have no 'fuzz' in 
> their duration, they are discrete like states of a Turing machine 
> computation. I'd say we perceive temporal order by overlap between 
> successive experiences. This is consistent with the idea that an 
> experience is not just a state of a computation, but a bundle of 
> states that constitute the same stream of consciousness. 
>  
> Brent 
>  

Whilst I'm sympathetic to that model, I can also imagine comparing 
one's current state, or a memory of one's current state, with a memory 
of a previous state, which is a discrete state model that is in 
contradiction to 2). I think this model implies one cannot be aware of 
the totality of one's state (ie that a subconsciousness exists), but 
does not entail the existence of an external world. 

As some whit put it, information is the difference that makes a 
difference (ie you have to compare two states in order to process 
information at all).  

Cheers 

--  

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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
Principal, High Performance Coders 
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au 
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
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