Hi Bruno Marchal  

Yes, my error, quanta are in spacetime too. 

I'm still adjusting to some of these concepts.


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/28/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Bruno Marchal  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-27, 09:01:08 
Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia 


On 26 Oct 2012, at 13:51, Roger Clough wrote: 

> Hi meekerdb 
> 
> Quanta do exist, and can be measured, 
> but by definition they can only be experienced as qualia, 
> (another word for experience) which can't be measured. 
> 
> Quanta are within spacetime, qualia are beyond spacetime. 


Not with comp (in the precise form "yes doctor" + Church Thesis). In  
that case quanta are also beyond space-time, like the numbers. 

Bruno 



> 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/26/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: meekerdb 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-25, 12:57:11 
> Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia 
> 
> 
> Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color  
> can be communicated 
> and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta  
> than qualia. So 
> extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur  
> you have a language for 
> communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most  
> people don't speak 
> differential equations either. But those are all things that can be  
> shared. The pain of 
> a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But  
> there are 
> experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce  
> objective scales of pain. So 
> I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the  
> language; I just don't 
> think color is the best example. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 
>> I agree. 
>> 
>> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It? 
>> less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper 
>> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle 
>> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they 
>> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the 
>> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and 
>> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more 
>> basic form of processing and the color processing is more  
>> complicated? 
>> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable 
>> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary 
>> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? 
>> 
>> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. 
>> Instead of ?hat is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question 
>> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist 
>> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the 
>> perception that I have a head with a brain? 
>> 
>> 2012/10/25 Roger Clough: 
>>> Dennett and others on qualia 
>>> 
>>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett 
>>> 
>>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. 
>>> 
>>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine,  
>>> the experience of taking a recreational drug, 
>>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes  
>>> that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for 
>>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways  
>>> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr?inger, 
>>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The  
>>> sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by 
>>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the  
>>> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller 
>>> knowledge than he has of the processes in 
>>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical  
>>> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] 
>>> 
>>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from  
>>> the fact that they are seen as posing a 
>>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body  
>>> problem. Much of the debate over their 
>>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, 
>>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain  
>>> features of qualia. As such, 
>>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 2) Dennett on qualia 
>>> 
>>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988),  
>>> [19] Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that  
>>> attempts to 
>>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make  
>>> a practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, 
>>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world  
>>> of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological  
>>> experimentation. 
>>> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is  
>>> so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in  
>>> the 
>>> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the  
>>> introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the  
>>> special 
>>> properties defined for qualia." 
>>> 
>>> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says 
>>> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they  
>>> are, but what they do.. 
>>> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, 
>>> 
>>> The "What's it like to be?" argument 
>>> Main article: Subjective character of experience 
>>> 
>>> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas  
>>> Nagel's 
>>> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates  
>>> over qualia. 
>>> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective  
>>> character, a 
>>> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious  
>>> mental states if and only i 
>>> if there is something that it is like to be that organism ?  
>>> something it is like for the organism." 
>>> 
>>> Nagel also suggests that the subjective 
>>> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by  
>>> the objective methods of 
>>> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we  
>>> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind 
>>> must account for the subjective character of experience, we must  
>>> admit that no presently 
>>> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6]  
>>> Furthermore, he states that 
>>> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be  
>>> contemplated 
>>> until more thought has been given to the general problem of  
>>> subjective and objective."[6] 
>>> 
>>> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) 
>>> 
>>> The zombie argument 
>>> Main article: Philosophical zombie 
>>> 
>>> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could  
>>> be physical duplicates of people, 
>>> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would  
>>> demonstrate outward behavior 
>>> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a  
>>> subjective phenomenology. 
>>> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility  
>>> of philosophical zombies is that 
>>> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give  
>>> rise to qualia?he zombie can only 
>>> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the  
>>> physical brain." 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
>>> 10/25/2012 
>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>>> 
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>> 
>> 
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