Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, my error, quanta are in spacetime too.
I'm still adjusting to some of these concepts. Roger Clough, [email protected] 10/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-27, 09:01:08 Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia On 26 Oct 2012, at 13:51, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi meekerdb > > Quanta do exist, and can be measured, > but by definition they can only be experienced as qualia, > (another word for experience) which can't be measured. > > Quanta are within spacetime, qualia are beyond spacetime. Not with comp (in the precise form "yes doctor" + Church Thesis). In that case quanta are also beyond space-time, like the numbers. Bruno > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 10/26/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > From: meekerdb > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-25, 12:57:11 > Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia > > > Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color > can be communicated > and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta > than qualia. So > extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur > you have a language for > communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most > people don't speak > differential equations either. But those are all things that can be > shared. The pain of > a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But > there are > experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce > objective scales of pain. So > I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the > language; I just don't > think color is the best example. > > Brent > > On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> I agree. >> >> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It? >> less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper >> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle >> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they >> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the >> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and >> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more >> basic form of processing and the color processing is more >> complicated? >> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable >> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary >> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? >> >> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. >> Instead of ?hat is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question >> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist >> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the >> perception that I have a head with a brain? >> >> 2012/10/25 Roger Clough: >>> Dennett and others on qualia >>> >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett >>> >>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. >>> >>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, >>> the experience of taking a recreational drug, >>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes >>> that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for >>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways >>> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr?inger, >>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The >>> sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by >>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the >>> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller >>> knowledge than he has of the processes in >>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical >>> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] >>> >>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from >>> the fact that they are seen as posing a >>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body >>> problem. Much of the debate over their >>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, >>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain >>> features of qualia. As such, >>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. >>> >>> >>> 2) Dennett on qualia >>> >>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988), >>> [19] Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that >>> attempts to >>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make >>> a practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, >>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world >>> of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychological >>> experimentation. >>> His argument attempts to show that, once the concept of qualia is >>> so imported, it turns out that we can either make no use of it in >>> the >>> situation in question, or that the questions posed by the >>> introduction of qualia are unanswerable precisely because of the >>> special >>> properties defined for qualia." >>> >>> Is this the height of arrogance or what ? Dennett essentially says >>> that qualia do not exist because he cannot explain them. >>> >>> >>> 3) The Nagel argument. The definition of qualia is not what they >>> are, but what they do.. >>> what role they play ion consciusness. On the same page as above, >>> >>> The "What's it like to be?" argument >>> Main article: Subjective character of experience >>> >>> Although it does not actually mention the word "qualia," Thomas >>> Nagel's >>> paper What Is it Like to Be a Bat?[4] is often cited in debates >>> over qualia. >>> Nagel argues that consciousness has an essentially subjective >>> character, a >>> what-it-is-like aspect. He states that "an organism has conscious >>> mental states if and only i >>> if there is something that it is like to be that organism ? >>> something it is like for the organism." >>> >>> Nagel also suggests that the subjective >>> aspect of the mind may not ever be sufficiently accounted for by >>> the objective methods of >>> reductionistic science (materialism). He claims that "[i]f we >>> acknowledge that a physical theory of mind >>> must account for the subjective character of experience, we must >>> admit that no presently >>> available conception gives us a clue how this could be done."[6] >>> Furthermore, he states that >>> "it seems unlikely that any physical theory of mind can be >>> contemplated >>> until more thought has been given to the general problem of >>> subjective and objective."[6] >>> >>> 4) The zombie argument (from the link already given) >>> >>> The zombie argument >>> Main article: Philosophical zombie >>> >>> " A similar argument holds that it is conceivable that there could >>> be physical duplicates of people, >>> called "zombies," without any qualia at all. These "zombies" would >>> demonstrate outward behavior >>> precisely similar to that of a normal human, but would not have a >>> subjective phenomenology. >>> It is worth noting that a necessary condition for the possibility >>> of philosophical zombies is that >>> there be no specific part or parts of the brain that directly give >>> rise to qualia?he zombie can only >>> exist if subjective consciousness is causally separate from the >>> physical brain." >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Roger Clough, [email protected] >>> 10/25/2012 >>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected] >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected] > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
