On 11/9/2012 11:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 08 Nov 2012, at 20:17, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/8/2012 10:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 08 Nov 2012, at 14:42, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 11/8/2012 6:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Stephen P. King

There are no accidents in Platonia.
There are also perfect parabolas, because
Platonia is the realm of necessary logic,
of pure reason and math, which are inextended.
Hi Roger,

There are no accidents in and all is perfect and there is no extension or time Platonia because we define Platonia that way. But if we are to take Platonia as our basic ontological theory we have a problem, we are unable to explain the necessity of the imperfect world of matter that has time and is imperfect.

Not at all. After Gödel and Co. we know that "Platonia", or simply Arithmetic is full of relative imperfections. The machines which lives in Platonia suffer all from intrinsic limitations. Now, we know that Platonia contains typhoon, black hole, big bangs, taxes and death. Platonism is not the same before and after Gödel-Turing. We can perhaps say that comp admits a more nietzchean reading of Plato. This could be called neo-neo-platonism, which is neoplatonism + Church thesis. It is also very pythagorean, as the numbers can, and have to, be seen in a new perspective.
Hi Bruno,

So why bother with the illusion of a physical world? If everything "just exists" in Platonia,

No, in platonia only 0, 1, 2, 3, ... exists.

Dear Bruno,

What I am trying to show is that we can derive the 'absoluteness' of the natural numbers from the mutual agreements (on consistency) between infinitely many minds. My idea follows the ideas of Zuckerman and Miranker here <http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0810/0810.4339.pdf>, where they see Platonia as the highest level of reason. In a sense, I am arguing from the fallible and perishable realm toward Platonia and you are arguing from Platonia. I am doing this to see if the arithmetic body problem can be solved "from below". Zuckerman and Miranker's paper <http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0810/0810.4339.pdf> seems to just assume many minds (as the combination of Russell Operators R and a member of an Index set A) as existing in Platonia. The problem with Z&Ms paper is that no consideration is given as to how the many minds interact with each other. I see the same kind of problem in comp.

The rest of existence, notably the couplings consciousness realities, exists in a secondary sense, in Platonia. They are epistemological realities obeying to the laws of computer science.

OK, but we need a theory of interactions between bodies for comp. To do that we have to show that there exist bodies and more than one. The solution that I see is the one that I deduce from Pratt's Chu space theory, but his theory requires that the mathematical and physical objects exist at the same level ontologically, in contradiction to your idea.

why does it need to exist elsewhere? Why have an "elsewhere"?

All the interest of having arithmetic as a TOE relies in the fact that it explain where the physical reality comes from, and why it divides into quanta and qualia.

You show a result that shows the extraction of the content of the 1p, but there is no way to index the differences needed to have the appearance of many bodies - each with a finite mind of their own.

   What is it in comp that necessitates the appearance of substances?

That is explained by the UDA reasoning.
The appearance of substances is more like a fact that we have to explain, once we bet the brain is a machine.

But isn't a bet something that we do when there are many possible choices and no way of knowing with certainty what the outcomes will be?

How do the relative values of numbers, which are fixed and eternal in your thinking, acts as something like a prime mover that projects or whatever is the proper word you wish to uses to explain the emanations from Platonia to this realm?

How do you explain the appearance of change from that which is changeless? You never seem to wish to go over the debate between Heraclitus and Parmenides and explain why you side with Parmenides.

I start from comp, then I derive consequences.
Then it happens that some mystics seems to have intuited some of those consequences, without using comp, or using very naïve (pre-Gödelian) intuition like in the "question of King Milinda".

The Questions of King Milinda can be found here: http://www.sacred-texts.com/bud/milinda.htm Thank you for this reference!

Now, to be sure, even the "physicist in me" has never taken for granted the existence of time, and has always felt himself more closer to Einstein and Hilbert than Prigogine or Brouwer.

You might not understand the problem of time <http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/9210011v1.pdf> nor the implications of Einstein and Hilbert's ideas in physics. A timeless physical universe is one where QM will not work except in the case where we imagine the entire universe is closed, has a single wavefunction and is in a bound state. We see this case explored in discussions of the Wheeler-deWitt equation <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wheeler%E2%80%93DeWitt_equation>. The main problem is that time is treated as a dimension.

But I insist that I am never defending any conception of reality. I assume we are machine, and then make a reasoning.

How can you make this claim given the fact that you have repeatedly stated that you believe in Arithmetic Realism and Platonism? Both imply a "conception of reality"!



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