Hi Stephen P. King and Bruno,

Perhaps these problems below fade away if you think 
of numbers in this way:

In the beginning were the numbers
and the numbers were with Mind and
the numbers were Mind.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-11-01, 14:21:55
Subject: Re: Numbers in the Platonic Realm

On 11/1/2012 11:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

[SPK] Bruno would have us, in step 8 of UDA, to "not assume a concrete robust 
physical universe". 


Reread step 8. Step 7 and step 8 are the only steps where I explicitly do 
assume a primitive physical reality. 
In step 8, it is done for the reductio ad absurdum.

Dear Bruno,

       I have cut and pasted your exact words from SANE04 and you still didn't 
understand... From: 

"...what  if we  don抰  grant a concrete robust  physical  universe?" 
"Actually the 8th present step will  explain 
that such a move is nevertheless without purpose. This will make the notion of 
concrete and 
existing universe completely devoid of  any  explicative  power.  It  will  
follow  that  a  much 
weaker and usual form of Ockham抯 razor can be used to conclude that not only 
physics has 
been  epistemologically reduced  to  machine  psychology, but that  憫matter拻 
has  been 
ontologically reduced to 憫mind拻 where mind is defined  as the  object study of 
machine psychology."

    My claim is that neither physical worlds nor numbers (or any other object 
that must supervene on mind) can be ontologically primitive. Both must emerge 
from a neutral ground that is neither and has no particular properties. 

[SPK] He goes on to argue that Occam's razor would demand that we reject the 
very idea of the existence of physical worlds 

Only of primitive physical worlds. And you did agree with this. I just prove 
this from comp. That's the originality. A bit of metaphysics is made into a 
theorem in a theory (comp).

    Can we agree that physical worlds emerge somehow from sharable aspects of 
multiple sheaves of computations?

[SPK]  given that he can 'show' how they can be reconstructed or derived from 
irreducible - and thus ontologically primitive - Arithmetic 'objects' {0, 1, +, 
*} that are "operating" somehow in an atemporal way. We should be able to make 
the argument run without ever appealing to a Platonic realm or any kind of 
'realism'. In my thinking, if arithmetic is powerful enough to be a TOE and run 
the TOE to generate our world, then that power should be obvious. My problem is 
that it looks tooo much like the 'explanation' of creation that we find in 
mythology, whether it is the Ptah of ancient Egypt or  the egg of Pangu or 
whatever other myth one might like. What makes an explanation framed in the 
sophisticated and formal language of modal logic any different?

I use the self-reference logic, for obvious reason. Again, this entails the sue 
of some modal logics, due to a *theorem* by Solovay. All correct machine whose 
beliefs extend RA obeys to G and G*. There is no choice in the matter.

    That is not changed or involved by my argument.

[SPK]     I agree 1000000000% with your point about 'miracles'. I am very 
suspicions of "special explanations' or 'natural conspiracies'.  (This comes 
from my upbringing as a "Bible-believing Fundamentalist" and eventual rejection 
of that literalist mental straight-jacket.) As I see things, any condition or 
situation that can be used to 'explain' some other conceptually difficult 
condition or situation should be either universal in that they apply anywhere 
and anytime 

But even in your theory anywhere and anytime must be defined by something more 
primitive, given that you agree that physics cannot be the fundamental theory, 
given that the physical reality is not primitive.

    The concepts of "where" and "when" (positions in a space-time) would seem 
to be rendered meaningless if there is no space-time (or observers/measurements 
to define it), no? OH, BTW, I don't think that we disagree that "physics cannot 
be the fundamental theory". Physics requires measurements/observations to be 
meaningful. Where I agree with you is in your considerations of 1p and observer 
indeterminacy. Where you and I disagree is on the question of resources. 
Resources are required for computations to "run" so there has to be the 
availability of resources involved in *any* consideration of computations. 
Ignoring these considerations by only considering computations as Platonic 
objects is wrong, IMHO.
    You seem to be OK with computations as purely timeless objects (in 
Platonia) that are such that somehow we finite entities can create physical 
objects that can implement (in their dynamical functions) instances of such, 
while I claim that computations are equivalence classes of functions that 
physical systems can implement *and* abstract objects. I see these two views as 
two poles of a spectrum. There is a lot more detail in my considerations that I 
do not have time to go into at this time...

    My Theory of comp: Sheaves of Computations/arithmetic - define -> 
particular physical states *and* sheaves of physical states - allow -> 
particular computations. They are mutually supervenient, neither is 
ontologically primitive. Both emerge from a property neutral ground.




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