On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that
then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how
'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even
particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.
I doubt that very much, ...
Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus
contradict comp, which is assumed also.
Dear Bruno,
Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of
1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating
with each other as a 'physical reality"?
There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.
Dear Bruno,
How exactly does the comparison occur?
By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical
quantization, which exists already.
Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an
equiprobable way.
?
There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-
called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It
seems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of the
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.
?
But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:
"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,
and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both
observations are correct in the first person picture of that
observer. A "person" with the third person perspective, sees
observers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse,
each with appropriate measure that can be computed from Quantum
Mechanics.
Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution
of observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from
that distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample
from it.
Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think the
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to
observe? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis
and the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen
which direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular
is observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen
interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take
this "spookiness" seriously."
The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.
?
I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider...
Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?
? ? ?
Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the
physical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how
it emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a
first person plural product, with the persons being all Löbian
machines, etc.
I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent
structure and not some pre-defined ordering.
Good.
Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical
laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,
I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is
impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique
Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.
? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to
find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good
quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.
Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-
consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness and
consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.
?
but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the
case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not
a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).
Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the
impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the
Satisfiability problem
It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first
persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of
first person experience on delays.
*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical
structure.
It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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