On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:

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On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:Hi Russell, I agree with this view, especially the part about thecompatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' thatthengives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I justphrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how'simple'can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that evenparticlescould be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for panpsychism.I doubt that very much, ...Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thuscontradict comp, which is assumed also.Dear Bruno,Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of1p that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicatingwith each other as a 'physical reality"?There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer fromobservation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.Dear Bruno, How exactly does the comparison occur?

`By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation`

`(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear`

`positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical`

`quantization, which exists already.`

Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in anequiprobable way.

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There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that wecannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the (so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily finditself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. Itseems to me that the observational act itself is a breaking of theperfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds.

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But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange betweenMallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:"Russell Standish: The predictions can easily depend of the'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give asimple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure thespin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer Bdecides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis,and Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Bothobservations are correct in the first person picture of thatobserver. A "person" with the third person perspective, seesobservers A and B as inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse,each with appropriate measure that can be computed from QuantumMechanics.Jacques Mallah: On the contrary, this is a textbook example of theway I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distributionof observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn fromthat distribution. There are no different sets of predictions fordifferent pictures, just the measure distribution and the samplefrom it.Russell Standish: It sounds to me like you don't think theprediction changes according to what the observer chooses toobserve? An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axisand the y axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosenwhich direction to measure the spin, the history of that particularis observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QMaltered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhageninterpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to thinkthat QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that becauseone didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of suchparticles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble arewell defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate asingle particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to takethis "spookiness" seriously."The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion ofa 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers inseparate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B haveobservables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of beingmutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a singlenarrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because theproblem of Satisfiability is being ignored.

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I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of aphysical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider...Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?? ? ?Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why thephysical reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and howit emerges from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed afirst person plural product, with the persons being all Löbianmachines, etc.I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergentstructure and not some pre-defined ordering.

Good.

Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physicallaws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it isimpossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a uniqueBoolean algebra for all possible 1p.

`? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to`

`find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good`

`quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.`

Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness andconsistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.

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but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been thecase without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was nota theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming theimpossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to theSatisfiability problem

`It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first`

`persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of`

`first person experience on delays.`

*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logicalstructure.

It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.