On 11/22/2012 9:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Nov 2012, at 00:20, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 15:43, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/19/2012 9:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 19 Nov 2012, at 02:12, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Nov 18, 2012 at 07:48:57PM -0500, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi Russell,
I agree with this view, especially the part about the
compatibility of bases leading to a 'sharing of realities' that
then
gives rise to an illusion of a single classical reality; I just
phrase the concepts differently. My question to you is how 'simple'
can an observer be, as a system? It seems to me that even particles
could be considered as observers. I buy Chalmers' argument for
panpsychism.
I doubt that very much, ...
Me too, as "pan" assumed some physical reality and thus contradict
comp, which is assumed also.
Dear Bruno,
Why are you not considering the 'pan' to cover a plurality of 1p
that are observing or otherwise interacting and communicating with
each other as a 'physical reality"?
There are two physical reality notions: the one which we infer from
observation and logic, like F = ma, F = km1m2/r^2, etc.
And the one explained by comp. We have to compare them to test comp.
Dear Bruno,
How exactly does the comparison occur?
By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
(the quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear
positive operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical
quantization, which exists already.
Dear Bruno,
How does the comparison occur? I will not ask what or who is
involved, only how. What means exists to compare and contrast a pair of
logics?
Comp seems to necessitate all possible physical worlds in an
equiprobable way.
?
Does not comp require all possible 1p to exist?
There is a deep problem with notions of priors as it seems that we
cannot escape from the problem of subjectivity as we see in the
(so-called) anthropic principle: each observer will necessarily find
itself in a world what has laws compatible with its existence. It
seems to me that /the observational act itself is a breaking of the
perfect symmetry of equiprobability of possible worlds/.
?
But this claim implies violence to the idea of a 3p.
I found at http://higgo.com/qti/Mallah.htm an exchange between
Mallah and Standish that seems to illustrate this problem:
*"**Russell Standish: *The predictions can easily depend of the
'picture' but must be consistent with each other. Let me give a
simple example: In one picture, observer A decides to measure the
spin of an electron in the x direction. In the other, observer B
decides to measure the spin of the electron in the y direction.
Observer A will see the spin of the electron aligned with x axis, and
Observer B will see it aligned with the y axis. Both observations are
correct in the first person picture of that observer. /A "person"
with the third person perspective, sees observers A and B as
inhabiting separate `worlds' of a multiverse, each with appropriate
measure that can be computed from Quantum Mechanics./
*Jacques Mallah: *On the contrary, this is a textbook example of the
way I said it works. The theory predicts some measure distribution of
observers; an individual observer sees an observation drawn from that
distribution. There are no different sets of predictions for
different pictures, just the measure distribution and the sample from it.
*Russell Standish: *It sounds to me like you don't think the
prediction changes according to what the observer chooses to observe?
An electron cannot have its spin aligned with the x axis and the y
axis at the same time. Once the experimenter has chosen which
direction to measure the spin, the history of that particular is
observer is constrained by that fact, and the predictions of QM
altered accordingly. This is true both in MWI and the Copenhagen
interpretation, and is the "spooky" nature of QM. I used to think
that QM gave predictions in terms of distributions, and that because
one didn't see isolated particles, rather ensembles of such
particles, I didn't see a problem. The properties of an ensemble are
well defined. However, the ability of experimenters to isolate a
single particle, such as a photon, or an atom, means we have to take
this "spookiness" seriously."
The idea of a 3p cannot be applied consistently to the notion of
a 'person' or observer if one is considering the 1p of observers in
separate 'worlds' of a multiverse unless, for example, A and B have
observables that mutually commute and thus have some chance of being
mutually consistent and capable of being integrated into a single
narrative. I think that this problem is being overlooked because the
problem of Satisfiability is being ignored.
?
I hope that we can agree that there is at least an illusion of a
physical world that 'we' - you, me, Russell, .... can consider...
Is it necessarily inconsistent with comp?
? ? ?
Not at all. The whole point of UDA is in explaining why the physical
reality is unavoidable for the dreaming numbers, and how it emerges
from + and * (in the "number base"). It is indeed a first person
plural product, with the persons being all Löbian machines, etc.
I am coming at the idea of a 'physical reality' as an emergent
structure and not some pre-defined ordering.
Good.
Comp gives the complete algorithm to extract bodies and physical
laws, making comp testable, even if that is technically difficult,
I claim that it is not even technically difficult; it is
impossible for the simple reason that there does not exist a unique
Boolean algebra for all possible 1p.
? (I agree such BA does not exist, but this is exactly what we need to
find a measure theorem à-la Gleason). We need a sufficiently good
quantum logic, and up to now the comp quantum logic fits rather well.
Gleason's theorem is interesting:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gleason%27s_theorem
"For a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or greater, the only possible
measure of the probability of the state associated with a particular
linear subspace a of the Hilbert space will have the form Tr(?(a) W),
the trace of the operator product of the projection operator ?(a) and
the density matrix W for the system."
We sidestep the problem of how we define the transition from pure
states to density matrices. Andrew's discussion might be seen as
addressing this...
Why? Because it cannot be proven to be satisfiable(aka globally
self-consistent) by any finite sequence of algorithms. Completeness
and consistency for such cannot be assumed a priori.
?
Do you ever address the question of satisfyability?
but up to now, it fits remarkably, and that would not have been the
case without QM. That would not have the case if "p->[]<>p" was not
a theorem of the Z1* logics (matter).
Your reasoning is correct only because you are assuming the
impossible to be true a priori: that there exists a solution to the
Satisfiability problem
It exists. "Satisfability" is non tractable, not insoluble. The first
persons don't care "waiting exponential time" by the invariance of
first person experience on delays.
Of course, but an infinite BA requires eternity (infinitely many
steps) to solve its satisfiability problem. I am not claiming
non-solubility; I am pointing out that the computation of satisfiability
must run to obtain a solution, otherwise it is false to claim that the
solution is accessible. It is a profound mistake to claim that the
existence of the largest prime number defines the exact sequence of
numerals that would enumerate that prime number. Similarly, the mere
possibility of satisfiability of a BA cannot be used to argue about the
particular distribution of propositions of the BA.
You are considering first persons in the eternal and ideal case,
but that does not connect omniscient machines to finite human brains.
This is the challenge to Plato and Parmenides, how do we bridge between
the Realm of Truth and the world of appearances? We could make claims
forever but showing a proof requires physical effort. There are no
shortcuts to knowledge. You seem to be OK with the idea that knowledge
can obtain 'for free'. Perhaps I am mistaken, but it seems that you are
assuming the impossible to be real.
*and* that it is accessible for any finitely expressible logical
structure.
It is accessible, but then I don't see at all the relevance of this.
Please explain how it is accessible.
--
Onward!
Stephen
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