On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Richard,
>
>
> On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
>> Bruno,
>> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>
>
>
> Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
> arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>
> Bruno
>

Since energy is what makes things happen
then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
Richard

>
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>    How exactly does the comparison occur?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation
>>>>>> (the
>>>>>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive
>>>>>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization,
>>>>>> which
>>>>>> exists already.
>>>>>> <snip>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are
>>>>> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be
>>>>> justified by
>>>>> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of
>>>> iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface
>>>> between
>>>> pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be
>>>> matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can
>>>> we
>>>> use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this?
>>>> On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The question though is how does that happen?
>>>
>>>
>>> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why
>>> and
>>> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics.
>>> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain
>>> why
>>> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey
>>> apparent
>>> laws
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> How do tangible things interface with logic -
>>>
>>>
>>> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some
>>> amount of consistency.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through
>>> what
>>> capacity can they express that obedience?
>>>
>>>
>>> With comp this can be derived from the laws to  which the entities
>>> (actually
>>> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys.
>>>
>>> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide
>>> 6,
>>> for example.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption
>>>>> of
>>>>> logic?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic
>>>>> quite
>>>>> a lot.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even
>>>> worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited
>>>> logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is
>>>> it
>>>> that you are reducing it from?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> ?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions,
>>>
>>>
>>> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a
>>> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork
>>> loin?
>>>
>>>
>>> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu
>>> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about
>>> it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or
>>> anything other than what they actually are)?
>>>
>>>
>>> By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to
>>> the
>>> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real
>>> case"
>>> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences".
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple
>>>>> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like
>>>> this:
>>>>
>>>> C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?"
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic.
>>>> (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not
>>> everything that makes sense is logical.
>>>
>>>
>>> You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and
>>> with
>>> UDA: at most.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic.
>>>> All
>>>> you really need is logic."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you
>>>> don't
>>>> need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic
>>>> (or
>>>> equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What does logic and arithmetic need?
>>>
>>>
>>> ?
>>> Nothing, I would say.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a
>>>>> machine/number  having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence
>>>>> of
>>>>> such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness
>>>> of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of
>>>> logic
>>>> at all.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like
>>>>
>>>> we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only
>>>> then.
>>>> We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab
>>>> derive q from those assumption.
>>>> etc.
>>>> Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between
>>>> proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related
>>>> to
>>>> foundations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can
>>> simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is
>>> capable
>>> of animating matter or minds by itself.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that,
>>>>> you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega
>>>>> answer to all possible questions.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize
>>>>> that
>>>>> we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the
>>>>> questions
>>>>> clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer,
>>>>> like
>>>>> seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even
>>>>> Pythagorus).
>>>>> This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between
>>>>> Plato and Aristotle in theology.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating
>>>> everything that doesn't fit our axioms?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it.
>>>> If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine
>>> focus from there.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the
>>> relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into
>>>>> a
>>>>> true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent.
>>>>>
>>>>> Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes
>>>>> things true? How does it actually happen?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with
>>>>> proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What are the mechanics of that assumption though?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal
>>>> numbers, etc.
>>>>
>>>> We start from what we agree on, since high school.
>>>>
>>>> It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current
>>> neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately
>>> circular
>>> too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage
>>> from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our
>>> attention from it.
>>>
>>>
>>> Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing
>>> that.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is
>>>> the ontology of proposition itself. What is it?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model
>>>> often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true,
>>>> and
>>>> they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world,
>>>> making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a
>>>> set of
>>>> set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection,
>>>> meaning
>>>> interesting mathematics.
>>>> It is an entire field of subject.
>>>>
>>>> With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on
>>>> the
>>>> horizon.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a
>>> proposition is.
>>>
>>>
>>> Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as
>>> mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc. We need much more
>>>
>>> progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties
>>> in
>>> comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal
>>> machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle,
>>> but
>>> it can help.
>>> Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is
>>> with
>>> comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently
>>> aristotelian) physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Who proposes?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the
>>>> 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous
>>> other
>>> numbers?
>>>
>>>
>>> By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and
>>> multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations
>>> with each others.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How do they do it exactly?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books,
>>>> or follow my explanations on FOAR.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor.
>>>
>>>
>>> You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical
>>> sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for
>>> example.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive.
>>>
>>>
>>> That's an higher level notion.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is the only magic that consciousness contains.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You make some jump here.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, it's only an editorial comment.
>>>
>>>
>>> Lol
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out
>>>> forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating
>>>> functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not
>>>> participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an
>>>> inert codex of blind axioms.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are
>>>>> willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is
>>>>> supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also
>>>>> Church
>>>>> thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much
>>>>> "philosophically").
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to
>>>> presume
>>>> that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other
>>>> logical
>>>> commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile)
>>>> commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner
>>>> doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the
>>>> start
>>>> and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from
>>>> the
>>>> same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a
>>>> sleight of
>>>> hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the
>>>> power
>>>> and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights,
>>>> audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King
>>>> of
>>>> Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate
>>>> and
>>>> dance Gangnam style?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is
>>>> rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense.
>>>>
>>>> On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open
>>>> in
>>>> matter of others consciousness.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use
>>> a
>>> certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it
>>> doesn't
>>> get to the hard problem.
>>>
>>>
>>> Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness
>>> to
>>> approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily
>>> incompletable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p,
>>>>> with
>>>>> p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical
>>>>> reality
>>>>> has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by
>>>>> the
>>>>> quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes
>>>>> possible to
>>>>> reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional
>>>>> logicians, who are not really aware of this.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all
>>>>> simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use
>>>>> logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are
>>>>> necessarily
>>>>> using when sending a post to a list (implicitly).
>>>>> AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer
>>>>> science and mathematical logic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind
>>>> the
>>>> curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find
>>>> is
>>>> not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of
>>>> discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does
>>>> not
>>>> supervene on logic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You are right on this. Even with comp.
>>>> With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable
>>>> way as we get also physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though.
>>>
>>>
>>> Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates
>>> nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but
>>> then
>>> it is your theory which amputates certain person.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is
>>> the
>>> same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though.
>>>
>>>
>>> As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown
>>> even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the
>>> natural
>>> extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge,
>>>
>>>
>>> We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt
>>> that
>>> 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start
>>> from
>>> the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is
>>> only
>>> recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of
>>> physical universe is controversial.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense.
>>>
>>>
>>> You are lucky.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity
>>>
>>>
>>> OK, but how will you define quantity, then?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - of naming experiences as an abstract collection.
>>>
>>>
>>> From what, on what?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without
>>>> logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which
>>>> suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to
>>>> me
>>>> that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not
>>>> primitive,
>>>> or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think
>>>> we
>>>> live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it
>>>> would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about
>>>> anything real if that were the case.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do
>>>> algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has
>>> to
>>> be an effect.
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Comparison is used in the everyday sense.
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense'
>>>>> being
>>>>> the reality
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer
>>>>> everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to
>>>>> understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why
>>>>> not
>>>>> just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?"
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the
>>>> beginning,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on
>>>> the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of
>>>> steam
>>>> engine, but this is more a matter of implementation.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also.
>>>> More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in
>>>>> term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if
>>>>> comp
>>>>> is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already
>>>>> refute the
>>>>> lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It
>>>>> gives
>>>>> at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope
>>>>> to get
>>>>> the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic
>>>> or
>>>> primitively physical.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding
>>>> assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their
>>>> relation).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist.
>>>
>>>
>>> If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful
>>> thinking,
>>> which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to
>>> give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part
>>> 2).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while
>>>> subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as
>>>> vestigial
>>>> deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to
>>>> understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines
>>>> already. You are the one who put the cold in some place.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math
>>> teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires
>>> seeing them with the right eyes.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, OK.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them,
>>> not the numbers themselves.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some
>>> people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and
>>> everyone
>>> taking the time to do the work,  about the truth of those relations.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will
>>> refelect
>>> whatever light is present.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical
>>> band
>>> of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black
>>> light.
>>> If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of
>>> anything.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the
>>>> sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts
>>>> fall
>>>> out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an
>>>> experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe
>>>> (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But
>>>> it is
>>>> not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness
>>>> to
>>>> them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of
>>>> entities
>>>> than any form of non comp.
>>>>
>>>> You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but
>>> in
>>> the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which
>>> overstates
>>> 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear
>>> of
>>> personal realism.
>>>
>>>
>>> It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption.
>>> The
>>> opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the
>>> attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms
>>>>> within that?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday
>>>>> logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more
>>>>> important, if only to understand how a computer functions.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna
>>>> salad
>>>> doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use
>>>> it to
>>>> prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer
>>>> and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume
>>>> comp,
>>>> so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics
>>>> are
>>>> related to computer science.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though?
>>>
>>>
>>> Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a
>>> kind of something).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical
>>> transformations on an input?
>>>
>>>
>>> Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number,
>>> and
>>> that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to
>>> deduce
>>> "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand
>>> now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance
>>> of
>>> intuition in math).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning:
>>>>>
>>>>> -showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction)
>>>>> -showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions
>>>>> (independence).
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth,
>>>>> etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing
>>>>> once
>>>>> you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument.
>>>>>
>>>>> In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult,
>>>>> because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like
>>>>> formal
>>>>> expressions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we
>>>>> tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for
>>>>> refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem
>>>>> for
>>>>> many.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe
>>>> that
>>>> we don't actually live in.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in
>>>> from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon
>>>> comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some
>>>> level.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way
>>> which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that
>>> prove that everything is yellow.
>>>
>>>
>>> All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just
>>> the
>>> comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to
>>> me.
>>> Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good
>>> philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory,
>>>> be
>>>> nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives
>>>> are
>>>> struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex,
>>>> more
>>>> money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which
>>> humans do things?
>>>
>>>
>>> So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let
>>> them
>>> sleep in the closet.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and
>>>> constant exploration,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I agree!
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why
>>>> would it?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When he explores and got punished,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical
>>> evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment?
>>>
>>>
>>> As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp
>>> assumption.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and
>>> intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them?
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care
>>> about punishment.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and
>>>> the
>>>> youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her
>>>> universal
>>>> inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought
>>>> him
>>>> here also. That's life.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be
>>> conscious, ...
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good
>>>> heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine,
>>>> we
>>>> might learn something.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of
>>> impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end
>>> up
>>> doing is reinventing ourselves.
>>>
>>>
>>> Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to
>>> reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and
>>> beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a
>>> priori independent of what is, or not.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
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