On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > Richard, > > > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> Bruno, >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic? > > > > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct. > > Bruno >
Since energy is what makes things happen then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe. Richard > >> >> On Wed, Nov 28, 2012 at 5:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 27 Nov 2012, at 19:52, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2012 1:01:26 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 20:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Monday, November 26, 2012 1:46:53 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 26 Nov 2012, at 13:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, November 23, 2012 11:54:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 22 Nov 2012, at 18:38, Stephen P. King wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> How exactly does the comparison occur? >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> By comparing the logic of the observable inferred from observation >>>>>> (the >>>>>> quantum logic based on the algebra of the observable/linear positive >>>>>> operators) and the logic obtained from the arithmetical quantization, >>>>>> which >>>>>> exists already. >>>>>> <snip> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> UDA refers to an argument. It is the argument showing that if we are >>>>> machine (even physical machine) then in fine physics has to be >>>>> justified by >>>>> the arithmetical relations, and some internal views related to it. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Isn't an argument a logical construct though? I can't argue a piece of >>>> iron into being magnetized. There has to be a plausible interface >>>> between >>>> pure logic and anything tangible, doesn't there? It doesn't have to be >>>> matter, even subjective experience is not conjured by logic alone. Can >>>> we >>>> use logic to alone to deny that we see what we see or feel what we feel? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Of course not. Why would logic ever deny this? >>>> On the contrary tangible things obeys some logic usually. >>> >>> >>> >>> The question though is how does that happen? >>> >>> >>> Actually comp is better than physics here. in physics we don't know why >>> and >>> how electron obey the SWE. It is the ureasonable use of math in physics. >>> With comp there is only math (arithmetic) and from this we can explain >>> why >>> numbers develop beliefs (axiomatically defined) and why they obey >>> apparent >>> laws >>> >>> >>> >>> How do tangible things interface with logic - >>> >>> >>> I guess they would not tangible if they do not. tangibility ask for some >>> amount of consistency. >>> >>> >>> >>> how do they know the logic is there, how do they 'obey' it, and through >>> what >>> capacity can they express that obedience? >>> >>> >>> With comp this can be derived from the laws to which the entities >>> (actually >>> 0, 1, 2, 3, ...) obeys. >>> >>> The number tree does not need to know anything for being able to divide >>> 6, >>> for example. >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Is your answer to 'what makes logic happen?' rooted in the presumption >>>>> of >>>>> logic? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> At the basic ontological level, I can limit the assumption in logic >>>>> quite >>>>> a lot. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not sure why that changes anything at all. I think it makes it even >>>> worse, because if you have a basic ontological level with very limited >>>> logical assumptions, and everything is reducible to that, then what is >>>> it >>>> that you are reducing it from? >>>> >>>> >>>> ? >>> >>> >>> >>> If a roast pork loin is really a string of binary instructions, >>> >>> >>> It can be that, but a string + a universal number can be decoded by a >>> universal numbers into the apperance of a roast pork. >>> >>> >>> >>> then why isn't it a string of binary instructions? We do we need the pork >>> loin? >>> >>> >>> Worst, we cannot make sense of it in some absolute ontological sense, bu >>> assuming comp, we can't avoid the delusion by the universal numbers about >>> it. >>> >>> >>> >>> Why do binary instructions make themselves seem like pork (or shapes or >>> anything other than what they actually are)? >>> >>> >>> By the decoding process, like 100011011110 can be decoded into add 0 to >>> the >>> content of register 1000. Of course it is more involved in the "real >>> case" >>> of the "roasted pork smelly experiences". >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Actually we don't need logic at the base ontological level, only simple >>>>> substitution rules and the +, * equality axioms. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Aren't rules and axioms the defining structures of logic? It sounds like >>>> this: >>>> >>>> C: "How can you justify the existence of logic with logic alone?" >>>> >>>> >>>> We can't. But we can derive the beliefs in logics in arithmetic. >>>> (We can't derive arithmetic from logic alone, already). >>> >>> >>> >>> We can derive logic from sense though. All logic makes sense but not >>> everything that makes sense is logical. >>> >>> >>> You are right, even with comp. You need arithmetic above. At least, and >>> with >>> UDA: at most. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> B: "Well, you don't need much logic. In fact you don't need any logic. >>>> All >>>> you really need is logic." >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> You need logic and arithmetic. Technically it can be shown that you >>>> don't >>>> need so much logic (equality axioms are almost enough). The arithmetic >>>> (or >>>> equivalent) part is more important. It is a technical detail. >>> >>> >>> >>> What does logic and arithmetic need? >>> >>> >>> ? >>> Nothing, I would say. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Only later we candefine an observer, in that ontology, as a >>>>> machine/number having bigger set of logical beliefs. But the existence >>>>> of >>>>> such machine does not require the belief or assumptions in that logic. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I'm not even bringing observers into it. I'm not talking about awareness >>>> of participants, I'm talking about the emergence of the possibility of >>>> logic >>>> at all. >>>> >>>> >>>> Logic is defined by the minimum we assume like >>>> >>>> we will say that "p & q" is true, when p is true and q is true, and only >>>> then. >>>> We will accept that if we assume p and if we assume (p->q), then we cab >>>> derive q from those assumption. >>>> etc. >>>> Logicians and computer scientist studies those kind of relations between >>>> proposition. It is a branch of math, and it is not necessarily related >>>> to >>>> foundations. >>> >>> >>> >>> So you are saying that logic comes from human teachings about how we can >>> simplify the relations of ideas, not a universal primitive which is >>> capable >>> of animating matter or minds by itself. >>> >>> >>> Yes. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That's ok with me, but you don't need any smoke or mirrors after that, >>>>> you are pretty much committed to 'because maths' as the alpha and omega >>>>> answer to all possible questions. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On the contrary. The math is used to be precise, and then to realize >>>>> that >>>>> we don't have the answers at all, but we do have tools to make the >>>>> questions >>>>> clearer, and sometimes this can give already some shape of the answer, >>>>> like >>>>> seeing that comp bactracks to Plato's conception of reality (even >>>>> Pythagorus). >>>>> This is not much. Just a remind that science has not decided between >>>>> Plato and Aristotle in theology. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How do we know that we aren't making the questions clearer by amputating >>>> everything that doesn't fit our axioms? >>>> >>>> >>>> If you believe some axioms is missing, you can add it. >>>> If an axiom does not please to you, you can propose another theory. >>> >>> >>> >>> I start from the entire universe as a single indivisible axiom and refine >>> focus from there. >>> >>> >>> >>> What entire universe? What is that, where does it come from? What is the >>> relation with consciousness. You start from what I want to explain. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> when translated in arithmetic, makes a relative physical certainty into >>>>> a >>>>> true Sigma_1 sentence, which has to be provable, and consistent. >>>>> >>>>> Proof and consistency, again, are already features of logic. What makes >>>>> things true? How does it actually happen? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> We assume some notion of arithmetical truth. I hope you can agree with >>>>> proposition like "44 is a prime number or 44 is not a prime number". >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> What are the mechanics of that assumption though? >>>> >>>> >>>> In comp we explains that mechanics with elementary arithmetic, universal >>>> numbers, etc. >>>> >>>> We start from what we agree on, since high school. >>>> >>>> It is not more circular than a brain scientist using his brain. >>> >>> >>> >>> I agree it is no more circular than neuroscience, but I think the current >>> neuroscientific approach to explaining consciousness is ultimately >>> circular >>> too. It might be a clue that the only way that we ourselves can disengage >>> from circular thoughts is by using our will to consciously shift our >>> attention from it. >>> >>> >>> Or resolve the circularity. Computer science provides tools for doing >>> that. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The details of the propositions are not interesting to me, rather it is >>>> the ontology of proposition itself. What is it? >>>> >>>> >>>> That is a very interesting question, but out of topic. Logician model >>>> often proposition by the set of worlds where those proposition are true, >>>> and >>>> they often defined world by the set of propositions true in that world, >>>> making eventually a proposition a set of set of worlds, and a world a >>>> set of >>>> set of worlds, and there are interesting "galois like" connection, >>>> meaning >>>> interesting mathematics. >>>> It is an entire field of subject. >>>> >>>> With comp we don't need to go that far yet, although it is clearly on >>>> the >>>> horizon. >>> >>> >>> >>> So comp is a proposition which has not yet proposed a theory of what a >>> proposition is. >>> >>> >>> Indeed. Proposition, as opposed to mere syntactical sentences, is as >>> mysterious as consciousness, meaning, reality, etc. We need much more >>> >>> progress to handle that kind of things. But we can avoid the difficulties >>> in >>> comp by attaching proposition to couple "sentence" + "what a universal >>> machine can do with the sentences". But this does not solve the riddle, >>> but >>> it can help. >>> Keep in mind that all what I show in how complex the mind-body issue is >>> with >>> comp, if only because we must change our mind on the (currently >>> aristotelian) physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Who proposes? >>>> >>>> >>>> Again, that is an interesting question too. here comp can answer, in the >>>> 3p view, a number relatively to a bunch of numbers. >>> >>> >>> >>> Why and how does a number propose (undefined non-numbers?) to numerous >>> other >>> numbers? >>> >>> >>> By virtue of the fact that they obeys the laws of addition and >>> multiplication, which enable them to have complex computational relations >>> with each others. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> How do they do it exactly? >>>> >>>> >>>> By using their relations with each others. You need to study some books, >>>> or follow my explanations on FOAR. >>> >>> >>> >>> What does it mean to use a relation though? It's sensory-motor metaphor. >>> >>> >>> You can't redefined all term. I use relation in the usual (mathematical >>> sense). A relation on a set A can be defined as a subset of AxA, for >>> example. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> To use is to employ something as an object for a subjective motive. >>> >>> >>> That's an higher level notion. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That is the only magic that consciousness contains. >>>> >>>> >>>> You make some jump here. >>> >>> >>> >>> Yes, it's only an editorial comment. >>> >>> >>> Lol >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Beyond that, it's just mind-numbing patterns playing themselves out >>>> forever. Participation is everything and no amount of interrogating >>>> functions can conceivably synthesize that from logic. Logic does not >>>> participate, it constrains and guides that which is participating as an >>>> inert codex of blind axioms. >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not much is assumed, except for UDA, where you are asked if you are >>>>> willing to accept a computer in place of your brain. The computer is >>>>> supposed to be reconfigured at some level of course. We assume also >>>>> Church >>>>> thesis, although it is easy to avoid it, technically (but not so much >>>>> "philosophically"). >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Church thesis is similarly reflexive logic. There is no reason to >>>> presume >>>> that because anything that can be put into a Boolean box has other >>>> logical >>>> commonalities that this (unquestionably important and worthwhile) >>>> commonality extends to causally efficacious presence. An air conditioner >>>> doesn't create air. Church assumes the air of sense making from the >>>> start >>>> and then shows how all manner of air conditioners can be assembled from >>>> the >>>> same fundamental blueprint. I'm not falling for it though. It's a >>>> sleight of >>>> hand maneuver. While functionalism does card tricks with logic, the >>>> power >>>> and reality of sense supplies the table, tablecloth, stage, lights, >>>> audience, and girl to saw in half. Yes, I see, you pulled my card, King >>>> of >>>> Diamonds, very impressive - truly, but how does it taste like chocolate >>>> and >>>> dance Gangnam style? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Comp explains why we cannot completely explain the sense, and this is >>>> rather nice as it prevents reductionist theories of sense. >>>> >>>> On the contrary, by being open to sense in machine, comp is rather open >>>> in >>>> matter of others consciousness. >>> >>> >>> >>> I don't see that explains the sense at all though. It explains how to use >>> a >>> certain kind of sense in a very powerful and extensible way, but it >>> doesn't >>> get to the hard problem. >>> >>> >>> Indeed, comp does not solve it per se. You need the G/G* incompleteness >>> to >>> approach the explanation, which can be shown to be necessarily >>> incompletable. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So the observability with measure one is given by []p = Bp & Dt & p, >>>>> with >>>>> p arithmetical sigma_1 (this is coherent with the way the physical >>>>> reality >>>>> has to be redefined through UDA). Then the quantum logic is given by >>>>> the >>>>> quantization []<>p, thanks to the law p -> []<>p, and this makes >>>>> possible to >>>>> reverse the Goldblatt modal translation of quantum logic into >>>>> arithmetic. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Way over my head, but it sounds like logic proving logic again. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> It is not your fault. Nobody knows logic, except the professional >>>>> logicians, who are not really aware of this. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I talk about logic, the branch of math, not logic the adjective for all >>>>> simple rational behavior that we all know. UDA does not use >>>>> logic-branch-math, but of course it use the logic that you are >>>>> necessarily >>>>> using when sending a post to a list (implicitly). >>>>> AUDA needs logic-the branch of math, due to the link between computer >>>>> science and mathematical logic. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> That's reasonable to me, but what I'm talking about is getting behind >>>> the >>>> curtain of 'simple rational behavior that we all know', and what I find >>>> is >>>> not a Platonic monoilith of idealism, but the ordinary experience of >>>> discernment and participation. Logic supervenes on sense, but sense does >>>> not >>>> supervene on logic. >>>> >>>> >>>> You are right on this. Even with comp. >>>> With comp sense supervene on logic and arithmetic though, in a testable >>>> way as we get also physics. >>> >>> >>> >>> Comp bases that supervenience on its own amputated axioms though. >>> >>> >>> Comp is the bet that we are machine (roughly speaking). This amputates >>> nothing, unless you amputate machines from thinking, consciousness, but >>> then >>> it is your theory which amputates certain person. >>> >>> >>> >>> It says, 'whatever fits in this box also fits in every other box that is >>> the >>> same size'. It disqualifies everything out of its own box though. >>> >>> >>> As a consequence we lost primitive matter, but then nobody has ever shown >>> even one evidence for the existence of primitive matter, beyond the >>> natural >>> extrapolation of what we see (which proves nothing for the ontology). >>> >>> >>> >>> It has no theory of where logic and arithmetic emerge, >>> >>> >>> We need to start from simple truth on which you can agree. If you doubt >>> that >>> 43 is prime, then I can explain nothing, indeed. But you seem to start >>> from >>> the entire universe, and sense, which nobody can really agree on. It is >>> only >>> recent that scientists approach the notion of sense, and the notion of >>> physical universe is controversial. >>> >>> >>> >>> while it is clear to me that they emerge from sense. >>> >>> >>> You are lucky. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Counting is the intellectual act of making sense of a quantity >>> >>> >>> OK, but how will you define quantity, then? >>> >>> >>> >>> - of naming experiences as an abstract collection. >>> >>> >>> From what, on what? >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Dreams prove that we are perfectly content to enjoy a universe without >>>> logical consistency, but there is not any proof that I know of which >>>> suggests that logic relies on qualia or matter. Therefore, it seems to >>>> me >>>> that logic must either be a psychic phenomenon and therefore not >>>> primitive, >>>> or that psychic phenomena is illogical and the universe which we think >>>> we >>>> live in is impossible. I don't think the latter is plausible because it >>>> would undermine our ability to have any kind of meaningful opinion about >>>> anything real if that were the case. >>>> >>>> >>>> It is unclear. Logic plays different role at many levels, and so do >>>> algebra, statistics, arithmetic, computer science. >>> >>> >>> >>> It isn't clear that logic is the cause. To the contrary, I think it has >>> to >>> be an effect. >>> >>> >>> No problem with this. I am a bit neutral on this issue. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Comparison is used in the everyday sense. >>>>> >>>>> Yes! Now that I understand. What's wrong with the 'everyday sense' >>>>> being >>>>> the reality >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> That would cut all the funding in fundamental sciences, as this answer >>>>> everything. It is a bit like "why do you waste your time trying to >>>>> understanding the thermo-kinetics of car motor and how car moves? Why >>>>> not >>>>> just accept that car moves when we press on the pedal?" >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I think just the opposite. My view says that thermo-kinetics is just the >>>> beginning, >>>> >>>> >>>> As a beginning it is fuzzy and assumes a priori much more. I do agree on >>>> the importance of the concept of heat, we might all be some sort of >>>> steam >>>> engine, but this is more a matter of implementation. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> we need to start studying what is the 'we' that presses the pedal also. >>>> More funding for interdisciplinary science as well as fundamental. >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The everyday sense is a part of reality, and I would understand it in >>>>> term of the simplest assumption possible. Then my point is only that if >>>>> comp >>>>> is true (that is, roughly, if we are machine) then we can already >>>>> refute the >>>>> lasting current idea that there is a primitive physical universe. It >>>>> gives >>>>> at least another rational conception of reality, which gives the hope >>>>> to get >>>>> the origin of the physical laws, and the material patterns. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I don't see the advantage of a reality which is primitively arithmetic >>>> or >>>> primitively physical. >>>> >>>> >>>> I just show that if comp is correct, then it is enough, and adding >>>> assumptions is cheating with respect to both mind and matter (and their >>>> relation). >>> >>> >>> >>> Then I don't see the advantage of a reality which is comp or materialist. >>> >>> >>> If you search advantages, then you let your mind open to wishful >>> thinking, >>> which is not a truth friendly attitude, even if the Löb formula seems to >>> give a sort of role to a form of arithmetical placebo (see sane04 part >>> 2). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Either way we are depersonalized and our lives are de-presented while >>>> subterranean abstractions crank out automatism with ourselves as >>>> vestigial >>>> deluded spectators, powerless in our inauthentic simulated worlds. >>>> >>>> >>>> No. I'm just afraid you get some bad math teachers. Or you are unable to >>>> understand that reductionism is provably dead about numbers and machines >>>> already. You are the one who put the cold in some place. >>>> >>> >>> It's hidden right in your words. "I'm just afraid you get some bad math >>> teachers" is admission that the beauty and warmth of mathematics requires >>> seeing them with the right eyes. >>> >>> >>> Yes, OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> It's your sense of numbers which is wonderful - your sensitivity to them, >>> not the numbers themselves. >>> >>> >>> That is debatable. I have learn to appreciate the numbers because some >>> people found amazing relations, and succeed in convincing me, and >>> everyone >>> taking the time to do the work, about the truth of those relations. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> They are just unconscious, automatic fragments of mirror which will >>> refelect >>> whatever light is present. >>> >>> >>> Yes. >>> >>> >>> >>> If your reason is particularly illuminating in the mathematical-logical >>> band >>> of sense, then it's like lighting up a fluorescent disco with a black >>> light. >>> If I go in there with only my FM radio to listen to, I don't hear much of >>> anything. >>> >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> If instead we look at what we are looking at, and see realism for the >>>> sensory experience that it is, then arithmetic truth and Hermetic arts >>>> fall >>>> out of it organically. Algebra and geometry coexist to serve an >>>> experiential, theatrical agenda, not a functional one. >>>> >>>> >>>> The sensory realism is 1p, and non communicable, and complex to describe >>>> (you poetry, novel, movies, music, etc.), so we can't build on it. But >>>> it is >>>> not because we build on 3p things, that we stop to ascribe consciousness >>>> to >>>> them, and indeed comp ascribe consciousness to a much vaster set of >>>> entities >>>> than any form of non comp. >>>> >>>> You just illustrate your reductionist conception of number and machine. >>> >>> >>> >>> Machine and number I think are as vast a universe as 1p experience, but >>> in >>> the impersonal 3p mode. From my view, it is functionalism which >>> overstates >>> 3p assumptions and compulsively assigns them to 1p, mainly out of a fear >>> of >>> personal realism. >>> >>> >>> It assigns 1p to them, yes. Strong AI too. It is part of the assumption. >>> The >>> opposite assumption treats them as zombie. In case of doubt I think the >>> attribution of consciousness to zombie is less damageable. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> and the specialized logic being one category of specialized mechanisms >>>>> within that? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Logic is not fundamental at all, for UDA, you need only the everyday >>>>> logic that you need to be able to do a pizza. Arithmetic is far more >>>>> important, if only to understand how a computer functions. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Haha, you're still telling me that a little bit of shit in the tuna >>>> salad >>>> doesn't count. If it tastes like logic, then I don't think you can use >>>> it to >>>> prop up a primitive that supervenes on logic. >>>> >>>> >>>> I never use the word logic. I use arithmetic which is infinitely richer >>>> and stronger. Logic is just a very good tool, like algebra. I assume >>>> comp, >>>> so it is normal that computer science plays some role, and many logics >>>> are >>>> related to computer science. >>> >>> >>> >>> Isn't arithmetic a kind of logic though? >>> >>> >>> Not really. (of course with "kind of" you might say that everything is a >>> kind of something). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Doesn't counting and addition require that an output is guided by logical >>> transformations on an input? >>> >>> >>> Not purely logical. It needs to assume some stuff, like 0 is a number, >>> and >>> that is not logical. The early 20th century logicians have tried to >>> deduce >>> "0 is a number" from logic, but they failed, and eventually we understand >>> now what it has to fail (failure of logicism, discovery of the importance >>> of >>> intuition in math). >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Yet more advanced logic can help for two things, when doing reasoning: >>>>> >>>>> -showing that a proposition follows from other propositions (deduction) >>>>> -showing that a proposition does not follow from other propositions >>>>> (independence). >>>>> >>>>> Then, concerning the relation between mind, thinking, feeling, truth, >>>>> etc. many result in logic put some light, and that is not astonishing >>>>> once >>>>> you bet on comp, even if temporarily for the sake of the argument. >>>>> >>>>> In logic, the branch of math, the beginning is the most difficult, >>>>> because you have to understand what you have to not understand, like >>>>> formal >>>>> expressions. >>>>> >>>>> Logic is just like algebra, and those things imposes themselves once we >>>>> tackle precise theories, and relations between theories. It helps for >>>>> refuting them, or representing a theory in another, etc. >>>>> >>>>> I know that comp invites to math, and that this seems to be a problem >>>>> for >>>>> many. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> To me the problem with comp is that it perfectly describes a universe >>>> that >>>> we don't actually live in. >>>> >>>> >>>> Not at all. Comp reformulate the problem into justifying what we live in >>>> from arithmetic with the internal views. If this don't match we abandon >>>> comp. Comp is just the assumption that we are machine emulable, at some >>>> level. >>> >>> >>> >>> That assumption makes it so that all internal views are modeled in a way >>> which automatically justifies them to comp. It is the yellow glasses that >>> prove that everything is yellow. >>> >>> >>> All theories are such glasses. You statement attacks science, not just >>> the >>> comp assumption. It criticize the act of doing assumption, it seems to >>> me. >>> Of course we can stop science and enjoy the view, and that can be a good >>> philosophy of life, but it is not what scientists do. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> In theory a formula could move my arm, because my arm could, in theory, >>>> be >>>> nothing but data, but in fact, that isn't what we see. Most of our lives >>>> are >>>> struggles for mathematically irrelevant resources - time, money, sex, >>>> more >>>> money, more sex, etc. They aren't arithmetically interesting problems. >>>> >>>> >>>> Don't confuse a tool and what humans do with it. >>> >>> >>> >>> Why not? What is a tool for humans other than some implement with which >>> humans do things? >>> >>> >>> So human can be guilty, not the tools. Guns are pacific, when human let >>> them >>> sleep in the closet. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> The universe which comp describes should be one of florid plasticity and >>>> constant exploration, >>>> >>>> >>>> I agree! >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> not struggle and frustration. How does a computer get frustrated? Why >>>> would it? >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> When he explores and got punished, >>> >>> >>> >>> I think that is an anthropomorphic projection. Is there any mathematical >>> evidence which shows outcomes effected by punishment? >>> >>> >>> As much as with human, by definition as humans are machine, by the comp >>> assumption. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Not talking about disadvantageous game conditions, but actual cruelty and >>> intention to cause hurt feelings. Do computers care if you punish them? >>> >>> >>> Yes. By definition of comp. I mean humans are computer and seems to care >>> about punishment. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> when authoritative arguments abound, when the elders fear too much and >>>> the >>>> youth not enough. The universal machine get frustrated when her >>>> universal >>>> inspiration is constrained by the contingencies, despite they brought >>>> him >>>> here also. That's life. >>> >>> >>> >>> That is life, but I don't think it's arithmetic. >>> >>> >>> Yes, but that is due to your a priori that machines cannot think, be >>> conscious, ... >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> But we can suggest better way, and listening to the others is a good >>>> heuristic, and when the other looks quite different, like with machine, >>>> we >>>> might learn something. >>> >>> >>> >>> The way I see it, my way opens the door to a whole new universe of >>> impersonal artifacts and beauty, while I think with comp, all we will end >>> up >>> doing is reinventing ourselves. >>> >>> >>> Perhaps. There is a sense to say that the creation is what God can use to >>> reivent himself all the time. But why would that prevent artifacts and >>> beauty? Is not more beautiful? Well, that's personal taste of course, a >>> priori independent of what is, or not. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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