On Friday, November 30, 2012 2:08:34 PM UTC-5, jessem wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:50 AM, Craig Weinberg
> > wrote:
>> On Friday, November 30, 2012 10:32:35 AM UTC-5, yanniru wrote:
>>> On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be>
>>> > Richard,
>>> > On 28 Nov 2012, at 12:18, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>> >> Bruno,
>>> >> Does any or all forms of energy come from arithmetic?
>>> > Yes. All forms (in the sense of stable appearances) have to come from
>>> > arithmetic if comp is true and my reasoning correct.
>>> > Bruno
>>> Since energy is what makes things happen
>>> then comp makes everything happen in Everett's universe.
>> If comp made things happen then we could simulate petroleum production in
>> a program and solve the world's energy problem. Instead, we find that in
>> all real implementations of computing, comp invariably consumes net energy.
>> Why would that be? Does comp allow anti-comp? Maybe we could run our
>> computers backwards and get some kilowatt hours back.
> Seems like this argument is confusing levels of simulations. If you have
> one simulated world on a computer which is complex enough to have its own
> simulated oil production, as well as simulated physical computers, then
> those computers could be used to simulate another world, a
> simulation-within-the-simulation. But obviously having petroleum production
> in the simulation-within-the-simulation is not going to provide any energy
> to the original simulated world, despite the fact that they are both
> computer simulations. So, the fact that we cannot get energy from
> simulations of oil production, and don't get wet from simulations of
> rainstorms and such, is no argument against the idea that our own universe
> might just be a computational system.
I'm using this argument precisely to show that comp has no sensible way of
handling levels of simulation. There is no simulation of energy, because
energy is intrinsically tied to *the sole cosmos of realized mass and
spacetime*. A simulation of motion is still motion. A simulation of color
is still color. I only need one layer of hardware to simulate endless
levels of cartoon universes, but none of these cartoon universes can
simulate anything 'outside' of the ground floor hardware. Within the
simulations, there is no problem. I can have a set of containers running
virtual Windows servers, and they can have virtual Web browsers on them,
which can run another virtual Windows server nested in that, etc... None of
them have any problem simulating whatever worldly conditions I want to
create. Whatever level confusion could arise is easily solved. I can change
one byte on a virtual gear of a virtual engine and have it go from
representing grinding torque and acceleration of mass to a ghostly image of
gear shaped shadows spinning merrily through each other.
Nothing like this happens in the bottom level of hardware. If anything
realism is defined explicitly in opposition to this arbitrary
materialization. There is strict thermodynamic conservation and concretely
irreversible events. From any level within any of the simulations, there is
no problem making radical changes to the physics on any other level, except
the level that actually touches matter-energy-space-time. Comp is based on
the reckless and unfounded assumption that there is no sole cosmos of
realized function, and it uses that error to lock us in a tautological
multiverse of Platonic phantoms. To me, it's great fiction, but it fails to
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