On Sun, Dec 9, 2012 at 12:37 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 1:36 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> If I understand your point correctly the deciding factor of an >> experiment's value is whether there is a result obtained not known before >> the experiment is conducted. > > > If a experiment produces nothing surprising then nothing is learned, and > ever time Bruno's experiment is preformed the result is always the same, > every box that can be checked in the lab notebook will be checked. > > > Further, you argue that in the case of QM (under the MWI), or in the >> case of duplicating entire Hubble volumes there is a definite result > > > MWI is just something to help to figure out what a theory means, but it > doesn't effect the numbers obtained for a experiment so forget it, in fact > forget the theory too, forget Quantum mechanics; the 2-slit experiment > always produces a unique result and one that can not be predicted > beforehand. > >From whose perspective is there a single unique result? From the God's-eye view of reality, there certainly is not a single outcome. Your issue is you use the God's-eye view for Bruno's experiment but not for the 2-slit experiment. > > And without a doubt the most popular interpretation of Quantum Mechanics > among working physicists is SUAC (Shut Up And Calculate), > That's not an interpretation at all. > it says that in the 2 slit experiment the absolute value of the square of > the value of the Schrodinger wave equation of a photon at a point on a > photographic plate will be the classical probability of finding the photon > at that point when you develop the plate. This prediction of Quantum > Mechanics has been proven to be correct many many times and according to > SUAC that's the end of the matter. > But those predicted probabilities are more similar to those of Bruno's first person indeterminacy than the strict "100% for all possibilities" that your reasoning seems to predict. Someone with assumptions would have a pretty easy time disproving the MWI of QM, but you not only do not reject MWI, but appear to favor it. Thus there is a contradiction somewhere. It is why I keep returning to the MWI in this thread. > > > > because those who observe different results cannot communicate with each >> other. This suggests the value of the experiment is in some part determined >> by how far apart the duplicates are separated. > > > One can always say that the results of a experiment could be invalidated > if new information is obtained, but in the case of the 2-slit experiment > this new information is not only unavailable it is in another universe and > so can never be available even in theory. > > > Perhaps then 10^1000 light years is sufficient? Such duplicates who >> could prove us wrong may in fact exist far far away. Max Tegmark has >> calculated that due to the limited number of quantum states a fixed volume >> can be in that statistically there is a duplicate exactly identical to you >> less than 10^10^28 meters away and 10^10^118 meters away there is an entire >> Hubble volume exactly identical to ours. > > > Yes, assuming the universe is much much much much bigger than anything we > will ever be able to observe, assuming that the universe is perfectly flat > and so doesn't curve around and form a finite multidimensional sphere > before it is allowed to get that big. And at present there is little > evidence to support that view and little evidence to refute it. It's true > that recently it has been found, from closely measuring the cosmic > microwave background radiation, that the universe is pretty flat so we know > for sure it's much bigger than what we can see, but we don't know for sure > that it's anywhere close to being big enough for what Tegmark is talking > about. > This reminded me a bit of "The Presumptuous Philosopher" thought experiment: It is the year 2100 and physicists have narrowed down the search for a theory of everything to only two remaining plausible candidate theories, T1 and T2 (using considerations from super-duper symmetry). According to T1 the world is very, very big but finite, and there are a total of a trillion trillion observers in the cosmos. According to T2, the world is very, very, very big but finite, and there are a trillion trillion trillion observers. The super-duper symmetry considerations seem to be roughly indifferent between these two theories. The physicists are planning on carrying out a simple experiment that will falsify one of the theories. Enter the presumptuous philosopher: "Hey guys, it is completely unnecessary for you to do the experiment, because I can already show to you that T2 is about a trillion times more likely to be true than T1 (whereupon the philosopher runs the God’s Coin Toss thought experiment and explains Model 3)!" One suspects the Nobel Prize committee to be a bit hesitant about awarding the presumptuous philosopher the big one for this contribution. In any case, what Tegmark shows is that when reality gets very big, stuff like QM becomes unavoidable. This happens in eternal inflation, infinitely large Hubble volumes, infinite cyclical universes, infinite brane collisions, and so on. In almost all theories invoked to explain the apparent fine-tuning of the universe we get realities large enough to realize QM (without assuming it at the start). If I remember correctly you are a Platonist. Do you believe there are platonic objects containing patterns complex enough to be conscious? If you had read all off Bruno's UDA paper you would have found that arithmetical realism and the CTM are enough to provide the infinite numbers observers experiencing all possible observations. Thus, these infinite observers along with first-person indeterminacy explain the apparent randomness seen in QM, even though from the God's-eye view, everything is deterministic. Had QM not been found, it would be strong evidence against the CTM. > > Don't get me wrong maybe it is big enough, in fact maybe the universe is > infinite, the flatness measurement is perfectly consistent with that, but > the measurement obviously has error bars and to prove the universe is > infinite they'd have to reduce to zero, and that's just not going to > happen. > People said it was impossible to prove evolution because it occurred over periods longer than we could ever hope to observe. There may be other ways to prove an idea that we don't at this point in time realize. > > > So the question of duplicates and whether or not we are them, and how >> they might effect our expectations of our future experiences is meaningful. > > > That depends on what "our" means. I really think the main cause of > confusion over this issue is not due to physics but to grammar. > > >> > Say the observer duplicated is an AI in a simulated environment. We >> duplicate the simulation and in one simulation insert a red ball into the >> environment and in another insert a green ball. The two simulations are >> never connected so for all intents and purposes (according to you) each AI >> obtains a single definite result. Do you agree that from the perspective of >> the AI in the simulation, before the duplication, the AI has a 50% chance >> of subjectively finding itself in a simulation containing a red ball? If >> not, why? >> > > Say there are 2 computers and both are running the Microsoft Word program. > I tell you that I am about to type the word "red" into one computer and the > word "green" into the other computer. The two computers are never connected > so each computer outputs a single definite result. Do you agree that there > is a 100% chance that Microsoft Word will input the word "red" from a > keyboard and display those ASCII characters on a screen and a 100% chance > that Microsoft Word will input the word "green" from a keyboard and display > those ASCII characters on a screen? > Yes I do. But that explains things from the God's-eye view. Instead I asked to consider the perspective on an AI. So if you consider Word as an intelligent AI, and it exists in the same exact state on both computers before you start typing, then it is one mind in the same state. Once you type different things into it, that one mind splits into two minds, and each observes only a single outcome. If you explained this to the AI prior to typing either "red" or "green" into it, that single undifferentiated mind could have no better than a 50% chance of predicting whether the next letter it sees entered is "r" or "g". Agree? > If not, why? > > > Perhaps you will disagree on the basis that there exists a being outside >> the simulation who can see both events in fact happened. >> > > No, I disagree because every observer who performs the 2-slit experiment > always gets a unique result and no observer who performs Bruno's experiment > ever gets a unique result; > You seem to not be placing yourself in the shoes of the person being duplicated. Only when you see through the eyes of the W-man or see through the eyes of the M-man do you get the result. If you would, read this short story: http://web.archive.org/web/20081122035540/http://www.leecorbin.com/PitAndDuplicate.html And tell me if you see any value in pressing the button. Does the guy in the pit have any hope of escape by doing so? What do you think his odds of escaping are each time he presses the button? > in the 2 slit case I don't know if the photon will hit the left or right > side of the plate but afterward I do and I get a unique result and can > check the left side box in my lab notebook or the right side box but never > both, in Bruno's experiment the outcome is always exactly the same and > every box that can be checked will be checked and I've learned nothing. > Under MWI, the outcome of the measurement is always exactly the same and completely deterministic and predictable before the experiment is conducted. How do you reconcile this with the observation of a single unique result? Do you not see the double standard here? > > But actually that's not even my main complaint, the main problem always > comes back to pronouns. Bruno says 1-p and 3-p should be appended to > pronouns and that will clear everything up, but what does a 3-p of a 1-p > even mean? > I don't know. It is what you keep using to ignore the 1st person views though. You describe the two first person views from a third person view, but the experiment asks you to evaluate the outcome strictly from the first person view. Just as you evaluate the outcome of measuring the photon from a single branch of the wave function. > Even more important the first person view needs a time dimension, OK maybe > in everyday life it's not essential but if duplicating chambers are > introduced it is. > > What city will you see? > Bruno says the question should be "What city will you see from your first > person perspective?" it would be interesting to know what city you will > see from my third person perspective but never mind, > Your third person perspective in this case, is analogous to the God's-eye view of the wave function. You already know what you will see from this view without having to do the experiment. To get the single definite result, you have to place yourself into the shoes of the person being duplicated, or the person split as the wave function branches. > the question still has those pesky pronouns in it. If "your first person > perspective" means "your first person perspective as of right now" then > "you" won't see any city at all in the future because the future is not > now. Yes down this path leads to madness but that's what happens if you > push on a string or try to establish a chain of identity by looking from > the present to the future, it only works by looking from the present to the > past because I know who I was but I don't know who I will be. > It's not as complicated as you make it out to be. > > > in my opinion however, this is no different from the possibility that >> some being or civilization "out there" has already proven MWI to be true. > > > Is your entire argument hinged on Many Worlds being true? In my opinion, > and I've been known to be wrong, Many Worlds is the best of all the bad > interpretations of Quantum Mechanics that have been proposed so far, but I > don't know if it's true. > My argument does not hinge on it, but you seem to understand the QM and the MWI, and you seem to understand how in QM under the MWI, the illusion of single definite result, and of probabilities and randomness are created through splitting. So I think if you are to ever understand step 3 of the UDA, it will be by you forming a connection with your existing understanding of the MWI. > > >> > In that case someone knows there is never a single unambiguous result > > > You seem to be saying that if MWI is true then its pointless to ever do a > experiment, but that can't be right. > Nothing unexpected is learned or found from the God's-eye view of the experiment, just as you agree nothing unexpected is learned or found from the third-person observer of the Washington Moscow duplication. > > > None of the QM text books would have to be rewritten to say that >> probability of observing the photon land on the left side of the plate is 1. >> > > All the text books say that after the 2 slit experiment is performed the > probability of observing the photon land on the left side of the plate is > always 1 or 0; they say it always produces a result. Things are different > with Bruno's experiment > I think you ought to keep reading the rest of the steps in the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm It will save each of us a lot of time. Jason > > John K Clark > > On Sat, Dec 8, 2012 at 12:02 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote: > > >> >> > According to MWI, the 2 slit experiment produces multiple results, just >>> as Bruno's experiment does. The only difference I see is the two observers >>> can meet up and argue over which one is right >>> >> >> Only? Besides that Mrs. Lincoln how did you like the play? >> >> >> AFTER I've sent a photon through the 2 slits when I develop the >>>> photographic plate I know with certainty if the photon hit the right or the >>>> left side of the plate and can put one and only one check mark in the right >>>> or left column in the lab notebook; but even AFTER Bruno's experiment is >>>> over, although Bruno claims it produces one and only one result it is still >>>> not known what check-mark to put in the notebook. >>>> >>> >>> > No. Under MWI, you put a near infinite number of check marks across a >>> near infinite number of notebooks, >>> >> >> But I (nobody else claims to be John Clark so this time the pronoun is >> not ambiguous) see only one notebook and all those Jason Reschs have >> checked every single box in it. So I have no results. >> >> >>> > with roughly half in one column and half in the other. >>> >> >> I can understand why you said "near infinite" as half of infinity is >> still infinite, but the fact is that something is either infinite or it is >> not and 10^1000 is no closer to infinite than the number 1 is. And I >> believe that the primary reason the many world's interpretation is not more >> accepted is the difficulty of mathematically making sense out of >> probability when infinity is involved. I still think many worlds is the >> best explanation that has ever been proposed for the weird stuff in the >> quantum world, but that doesn't necessarily mean it's it a good explanation. >> >> >> > Bruno insist that there can only be one check-mark, so should it go in >>>> the Moscow column or the Washington column? Bruno can't say nor can anybody >>>> else. >>>> >>> >>> > Bruno insists each person can only write one check mark. No person >>> puts a check mark under both M and W. >>> >> >> But there are 2 persons and so there are 2 check marks in my lab >> notebook, and so unlike the 2 slit experiment in this one I have learned >> absolutely nothing and am no wiser that I was before anybody was >> duplicated. >> >> *> Why is it a single unambiguous result in the case where the >>> experiment creates 10^1000 duplicates, but not 2 duplicates???* >>> >> >> If the many world's interpretation is correct (a big if) then after the >> experiment there are 10^1000 Jason Reschs in 10^1000 universes looking at >> 10^1000 spots in 10^1000 different positions on that photographic plate, >> but in each universe there is only one "you" and only one spot and "you" >> can find nobody else who claims to be Jason Resch. In addition a third >> party will remember "you" before the experiment and observe that now that >> the experiment is over and there is nobody to challenge the claim of >> identity the question of who is "you" or what the word means simply doesn't >> come up. >> >> To be equivalent to Bruno's experiment there would be 2 Jason Reschs in >> each of the 10^1000 universes and they would be looking at 2 different >> spots on that photographic plate. But that's not the 2-slit experiment and >> that's not many worlds. >> >> >> I don't care about prediction, my problem is that Bruno can't give a >>>> definite answer about the outcome of the experiment even AFTER it's done. >>>> So what's the point of it? >>>> >>> >>> > The outcome concerns first person experience >>> >> >> Yes but there are now 2 Jason Resch perspectives and it's important to >> know which one is being referred to, and the pronouns "you" simply isn't up >> to the task. >> >> > just like it does when you measure the "single definite outcome" of >>> where the photon hit the plate. There is no single definite outcome in the >>> third person sense, only in the first person experience. >>> >> >> That is not true, after the two slit experiment a third party observes >> just one Jason Resch looking at just one spot, in Bruno's experiment a >> third party observes 2 Jason Reschs looking at 2 different cities. >> >> > The important question is "after duplication and differentiation, which >>> John Clark will I (subjectively) perceive myself to be?" >>> >> >> John Clark hates pronouns!!!! >> >> > > to expect a single unique answer to the question "what city will >>>> "you" see?" is rather silly. >>>> >>> >>> > No, because from a first person view, any entity can see only one >>> outcome, >>> >> >> Yes, because there are now 2 first person views of interest. >> >> >> > You don't find it silly to predict the probability distribution of >>> where you might observer the photon to strike, do you? >> >> >> No, John Clark doesn't find that silly because in that case the precise >> meaning of the word "you" doesn't effect the outcome so John Clark doesn't >> have to worry about it. >> >> > After it is pressed, each of my copies knows which one and only one >>> city they saw. >>> >> >> Yes. >> >> >> > each of my copies in the wave function knows exactly which location the >>> photon struck. >> >> >> Yes, and trouble is only encountered when the question is "but which one >> and only one is "me"?"". >> >> >>> > After the experiment I don't need to assign probabilities, I just >>>> develop the photographic plate and I know for certain where the photon hit, >>>> and there is nothing equivalent to that in Bruno's experiment. >>> >>> >>> >> There is. You open the door and see which city you find yourself in. >>> >> John Clark hates pronouns!!!! >> >> John K Clark >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.