On 12 Dec 2012, at 17:04, Roger Clough wrote:

HiBruno Marchal

Yes, a computer can have a memory, but it would
essentially be (I presume) a non-selective, direct recording of its
previous experiences.

We are not talking about your laptop, but on any computer, and with the CTM, your brain is one (well, it is at least one even without CTM, but with CTM there is nothing more to it).





Perhaps I am being too demanding, but
human memory is not just such a recording.

"such a recording" no. But even human build computers or computing systems can do more sophisticate form of recording. Neural nets can memorize information in a distributed way, without any explicit register.

Do not confuse good and bad computing metaphors with the comp hypothesis. It is not because I am a machine, that I am *that* or *this* machine or type of machine.



Only events that have important personal emotional
content, or those that we focus attention on, are generally
recorded.  Such as the day JFK was assassinated,
or that a stove can burn you, or memorizing the
material needed for a quiz or a birthday party.
These  have personal value. To expect a computer
to assemble and maintain such a memory seems to
beg credibility.

But what else? Asking for something non Turing emulable/recoverable beg for superstition.

Don't think from the computers of today, but from their mathematical definition. Today's computers are not even as complex as the protobacteria before life begun.

Bruno




Those events in my life in memory are personal and define
who I am from where I was.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
12/12/2012
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-12-11, 10:27:35
Subject: Re: I am my memory, which is provided by my 1p.

On 11 Dec 2012, at 13:17, Roger Clough wrote:

> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> My personal introspection will always have my personal
> memory as context, which a computer will not have.

This is weird. Personal computer have already personal memory, even if
today they borrow it from their user. But personal memory is easy to
implement. Now the 1p is not just memory (even if this is enough in
UDA). There is a distinct person quale associated to it.



> One can in fact say that I am my memory.

In some approximation.



> My
> memory is the identity of my 1p and is what my 1p sees.
>
> This is perhaps the most serioous problem of comp.

Frankly .... I can understand people not convinced that a computer can
have a quale associated to the memory, but memory and personal memory
does not pose any problem in computers. Then I have explained why they
have a quale too.

Bruno



>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/11/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-10, 09:29:08
> Subject: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by
> cognitivescience
>
>
>
>
> On 10 Dec 2012, at 13:59, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Russell Standish
>
> Actual introspection is subjective, not objective.
> Computers as I understand them can only think objectively.
>
>
> But now we know better. Computers are champion in introspection, and
> they have a rich subjective life. Even without comp or CTM, and with
> just the usual definition of knowledge in analytical philosophy.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 12/10/2012
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Russell Standish
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2012-12-09, 01:42:47
> Subject: Re: Re: Introspection (internal 1p) has been dropped by
> cognitivescience
>
>
> On Sat, Dec 08, 2012 at 06:34:56AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
>> Hi Russell Standish
>>
>> He's talking about psychological introspection using
>> everyday language and concepts. Philosophical
>> introspection a la Kant for example, is more formal
>> and precise and uses formal categories.
>>
>
> I don't see a distinction in the topic, or problem being solved - just
> a difference in tools used.
>
> Modern AI uses less formal logic these days, and more statistical
> modelling (such as in the website I referenced).
>
> Cheers
>
> --
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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