On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 10:14:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 21 Jan 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Monday, January 21, 2013 12:31:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Impossible, or comp is false. No machine can ever figure out that   
> > there is anything without postulating it by faith. The fact that   
> > such postulation is unconscious makes this counter-intuitive, but   
> > with comp it is provable with mathematical logic. 
> > 
> > Aha, now this is interesting. Here I can begin to see the sub- 
> > arithmetic sense that you are working with. By 'figure out', do you   
> > mean that a machine has a conscious experience of reasoning? 
> Not systematically. Only if she is universal, or perhaps she has to be   
> Löbian. I am still not sure on this. 
> > Or is the reasoning as unconscious as the faith upon which said   
> > reasoning must rely? 
> Hard to say. But most people (as this discussion actually illustrates)   
> are not aware that the idea of a primary universe is something that we   
> infer. It is not something that we live. It is unconscious theory. It   
> is obvious (by natiral selection) that it would be a waste of energy   
> and time to make this systematically conscious. 

I think of the universe not so much as something we live or infer as just 
the ultimate context of consideration. Sort of the idea of the largest 
possible "here".

> > Where does provability by mathematical logic come in? 
> I model the belief of an ideally correct machine by its provability   
> predicate. This is a predicate that we can translate in the language   
> of the machine (in arithmetic for example), an,d which obeys the usual   
> axiom for rational belief: 
> [](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q) 
> []p -> [][]p (for the "rich" machines). 
> Rules: modus ponens and necessitation (p/[]p). 
> In such a machine case, the machines (and all its consistent   
> extensions) will obey the Löb axioms: []([]p -> p) -> []p, which is   
> the building block of the comp hypostases. 
> In that frame work, the inferences in the proposition <>t, and more   
> generally of propositions in G* minus G, plays the role of   
> consciousness. But the inference itself is not conscious. 
It only makes sense to me that propositions are a facet of conscious 
experience. I don't see that propositions, or words, or figures drawn on 
paper, or any other symbolic form would themselves play at consciousness. 
We might infer they are conscious, like a cartoon or puppet, but I don't 
see any reason to suspect that symbols would suddenly become actually 
conscious at some point because of complexity or scale.

> > Why doesn't everything use unconscious faith 
> Faith is always conscious. The inference itself might be or not   
> unconscious, so I guess what you mean. If I said "unconscious faith",   
> I meant "unconscious inference of something" and the "unconscious"   
> bears on "inference", not on the content of the faith. 

Ok, I can see where an inference would be unavailable to personal 
consciousness (I call this perceptual inertia - expectations become 
backgrounded and implicit) but because we are organisms with particularly 
elaborate consciousness, I would not rule out that what has become less 
than conscious to us at the personal level is still conscious on 
sub-personal levels. Sub-conscious to 'us', but conscious to whatever 
community of sub-selves insist within us. You would call these machines, 
but I would say that their mechanistic qualities are a function of the 
subordinate relation. What we don't relate to personally is perceived 
through a filter of impersonality. Add to that that there may indeed be, in 
an absolute sense, less degrees of freedom on the sub-personal levels as 
they extend into the inorganic levels of description - which is where we 
find the protocols of arithmetic.

Side note - The idea of this sliding scale of personal identification can 
be applied to typical gender relations, as there is a somewhat exceptional 
role that gender plays in the sense of being both objectified due to 
social-biological unfamiliarity but also charged with overly subjective 
archetypal association. A tendency to feel that members of the opposite sex 
are presented as both deeply 'within' us and at the same time far outside 
of us.

> > or how does unconscious faith become conscious only to become   
> > partially obscured once again and in need of proof to restore it to   
> > consciousness? 
> No need of proof as there is none. That consciousness comes, and quit   
> is usual. You are quite conscious of driving when being a young   
> driver, then most of the driving become unconscious when older ...   
> until you get a problem with the car and are conscious again.   
> Consciousness is related to focusing attention, notably. 
> I agree, focusing attention is probably the primordial motor capacity in 
the universe. Participation in its rawest form begins with the ability to 
express a personal preference of one perceptual opportunity over another, 
or, at least in the case of humans, to create a new opportunity altogether.

> > It seems like the forces which are shaping faith into these   
> > different qualities of consciousness are actually the more relevant   
> > agents. 
> With comp, forces are a product of consciousness. 

Why aren't they the product of computation?

> > What would be the reason for or method of bringing a machine's   
> > unconscious faith into a conscious experiential mode? 
> The machine is conscious when she infer <>t and other G*\ G- 
> propositions (true but non provable/believable). 

This seems to be a very narrow expectation of consciousness. When any 
organism "Wakes up", they become conscious, but I do not see that the 
criteria of being able to "infer <>t and other G*\ G-  propositions" is 
either necessary or sufficient to explain the experience of waking up.

This confers to her   
> an ability to evolve, to change her mind, to speed-up its   
> computability abilities, to focuse attention, to differentiate on   
> different consistent extensions, etc. Of course there a tuns of open   
> problems. the advantage here is that we get physical consequences so   
> we can test that theory of consciousness. 

Only if you infer that propositions do more than serve as an inert mirror 
or lens of our rational projection. I don't see any reason to guess that 
ever happens, to the contrary, our experience is filled with examples of 
why the menu is not the meal, the map is not the territory, etc. Bugs Bunny 
seems like he acts like a character because he is drawn and animated in 
such a way as to direct to our own private human experience of character, 
not because animation has convinced the cartoon itself to become conscious.


> Bruno 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 

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