On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 1:15:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 22 Jan 2013, at 18:26, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 10:14:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 21 Jan 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Monday, January 21, 2013 12:31:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > Impossible, or comp is false. No machine can ever figure out that > > > there is anything without postulating it by faith. The fact that > > > such postulation is unconscious makes this counter-intuitive, but > > > with comp it is provable with mathematical logic. > > > > > > Aha, now this is interesting. Here I can begin to see the sub- > > > arithmetic sense that you are working with. By 'figure out', do you > > > mean that a machine has a conscious experience of reasoning? > > > > Not systematically. Only if she is universal, or perhaps she has to be > > Löbian. I am still not sure on this. > > > > > > > > > Or is the reasoning as unconscious as the faith upon which said > > > reasoning must rely? > > > > Hard to say. But most people (as this discussion actually illustrates) > > are not aware that the idea of a primary universe is something that we > > infer. It is not something that we live. It is unconscious theory. It > > is obvious (by natiral selection) that it would be a waste of energy > > and time to make this systematically conscious. > > > > I think of the universe not so much as something we live or infer as > > just the ultimate context of consideration. Sort of the idea of the > > largest possible "here". > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Where does provability by mathematical logic come in? > > > > I model the belief of an ideally correct machine by its provability > > predicate. This is a predicate that we can translate in the language > > of the machine (in arithmetic for example), an,d which obeys the usual > > axiom for rational belief: > > (p -> q) -> (p -> q) > > p -> p (for the "rich" machines). > > Rules: modus ponens and necessitation (p/p). > > In such a machine case, the machines (and all its consistent > > extensions) will obey the Löb axioms: (p -> p) -> p, which is > > the building block of the comp hypostases. > > In that frame work, the inferences in the proposition <>t, and more > > generally of propositions in G* minus G, plays the role of > > consciousness. But the inference itself is not conscious. > > > > > > It only makes sense to me that propositions are a facet of conscious > > experience. > > Not necessarily. Don't confuse the propositions and the content of the > proposition. >
The form of a proposition is an even more abstract facet of conscious experience. > > > > > I don't see that propositions, or words, or figures drawn on paper, > > or any other symbolic form would themselves play at consciousness. > > Indeed, they don't. No more than SWE, or a book on black hole. Even > neurons does not "play at" consciousness in the comp theory. They make > it only relatively manifestable. Consciousness is already "beyond > word". It is a mystical truth, yet quite common. > Then why would comp be primitive and not the mystical truth through which comp comes to our attention? > > > > > We might infer they are conscious, like a cartoon or puppet, but I > > don't see any reason to suspect that symbols would suddenly become > > actually conscious at some point because of complexity or scale. > > What is conscious is the person making the inference (of a reality). > Consciousness is not the inference, not the symbols used, etc. > Why not? What else would they be? > Consciousness is in the knowledge of the person, Consciousness makes knowledge available to a person in the first place. Unconscious people can gain no knowledge. Conscious people can be conscious whether or not they acquire any knowledge. This may be the core disagreement that I have with your position. Consciousness is in knowledge? Not a chance. Pain hurts whether or not you know anything about anything. > and that is non > computably associated to infinities of computations. But it can obeys > laws, and be described with a theory, or a meta-theory, because > consciousness has no formal term to refer to it. Like arithmetical > truth has no term to refer to it in arithmetic. that is why modal > logic is useful, as it makes possible to talk about things which have > no descriptions. > That assumes that logic is independent of consciousness. I see that it is actually the range of conscious presentations which is furthest from the core. Logic is sense, but it is the sense of the opposite of sense - automated inevitable senseless sense. Applying modal logic to consciousness in that way is like going into a cave with a blacklight and fluorescent paint to study the sun. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Why doesn't everything use unconscious faith > > > > Faith is always conscious. The inference itself might be or not > > unconscious, so I guess what you mean. If I said "unconscious faith", > > I meant "unconscious inference of something" and the "unconscious" > > bears on "inference", not on the content of the faith. > > > > Ok, I can see where an inference would be unavailable to personal > > consciousness (I call this perceptual inertia - expectations become > > backgrounded and implicit) but because we are organisms with > > particularly elaborate consciousness, I would not rule out that what > > has become less than conscious to us at the personal level is still > > conscious on sub-personal levels. > > I tend to believe this, actually. But not really from my reflexion of > comp, but from my reading of books on brains, and then my reading of > salvia reports (and other plants). > I tend to think that our consciousness result from the association of > at least a dozen of "already conscious beings" integrated in some way. > some drugs dissociates those "presence". Amazingly some presence might > not been in the brain, but in arithmetic, to which our brain is > naturally connected. > Sounds good to me. Except the last part, where I would say that both our brain and arithmetic are reflections of the underlying experience of participation. > > It is an open problem to relate this with the 8 hypostases. Normally > only two of them "experience consciousness" (S4Grz1 and the X1*). But > things can be more complex. > > > Can't help you there ;) > > > Sub-conscious to 'us', but conscious to whatever community of sub- > > selves insist within us. > > I can be quite OK with this. > Nice! > > > > You would call these machines, but I would say that their > > mechanistic qualities are a function of the subordinate relation. > > What we don't relate to personally is perceived through a filter of > > impersonality. Add to that that there may indeed be, in an absolute > > sense, less degrees of freedom on the sub-personal levels as they > > extend into the inorganic levels of description - which is where we > > find the protocols of arithmetic. > > Hmm... here we might differ. But this comes, I guess from on > difference on comp. > > > > > > Side note - The idea of this sliding scale of personal > > identification can be applied to typical gender relations, as there > > is a somewhat exceptional role that gender plays in the sense of > > being both objectified due to social-biological unfamiliarity but > > also charged with overly subjective archetypal association. A > > tendency to feel that members of the opposite sex are presented as > > both deeply 'within' us and at the same time far outside of us. > > OK. > > > > > > > > > > > or how does unconscious faith become conscious only to become > > > partially obscured once again and in need of proof to restore it to > > > consciousness? > > > > No need of proof as there is none. That consciousness comes, and quit > > is usual. You are quite conscious of driving when being a young > > driver, then most of the driving become unconscious when older ... > > until you get a problem with the car and are conscious again. > > Consciousness is related to focusing attention, notably. > > > > > > I agree, focusing attention is probably the primordial motor > > capacity in the universe. Participation in its rawest form begins > > with the ability to express a personal preference of one perceptual > > opportunity over another, or, at least in the case of humans, to > > create a new opportunity altogether. > > OK. > > > > > > > > > It seems like the forces which are shaping faith into these > > > different qualities of consciousness are actually the more relevant > > > agents. > > > > With comp, forces are a product of consciousness. > > > > Why aren't they the product of computation? > > By UDA. The forces are physical (F=ma), or related to physical (love). > They emerge from the competition of infinities of universal machines > emulating the more fine grained (with respect to the comp substitution > level) computations leading to our comp state. It comes from the first > person indeterminacy; the global one on the whole UD* or arithmetic. > > I believe that if you accept the initial assumptions that you do it would make sense, but I question that there can be machines at all without a priori perception-participation. > > > > > > > > > > > > > What would be the reason for or method of bringing a machine's > > > unconscious faith into a conscious experiential mode? > > > > The machine is conscious when she infer <>t and other G*\ G- > > propositions (true but non provable/believable). > > > > This seems to be a very narrow expectation of consciousness. When > > any organism "Wakes up", they become conscious, > > They can be conscious also in sleep, even in non REM sleep. Waking up > will only correlate that consciousness with a sharable computation. > But yes, when you wake up, you are usually conscious (although some > need to get enough coffee to correlate the consciousness with some > possible reality:) > > Sure, we can be conscious in sleep too (although every state of consciousness has its own qualities, so hard to say if 'we' are as conscious as 'we' think during a lucid dream). It's not a bad thought to consider waking up to be comparable to public sharing mode (like getting on the internet really) although that to me seems unsupported by pure computation. A computer doesn't seem to have much fanfare associated with accessing the connection to a network. Intuitively it seems that waking up is a massive psycho-physiological transformation rather than a simple mode-flip. > > > > but I do not see that the criteria of being able to "infer <>t and > > other G*\ G- propositions" is either necessary or sufficient to > > explain the experience of waking up. > > Because when you wake up, you will put your feet on the ground and you > will infer (unconsciously) that your feet will not go through the > ground. Somehow you bet on a reality which satisfy your desire > (walking, drinking coffee, etc.). You bet on a "reality", and this can > be explained to be equivalent with betting in self-consistency (it is > easy if we limit the language of the machine, and tricky in the > general case: I usually simplify a bit the language of the machine to > prove this, to be honest). > I think that isn't what is really going on, although it makes sense retrospectively. What it seems like is that when you wake up you resume the 'narrative of primary significance' where you left off. You could wake up in a dream that was highly unrealistic, but still have the feeling that you just woke up. It's a qualia, or even a meta-qualia - a raw awareness of being present (anywhere). > > > > > > > > This confers to her > > an ability to evolve, to change her mind, to speed-up its > > computability abilities, to focuse attention, to differentiate on > > different consistent extensions, etc. Of course there a tuns of open > > problems. the advantage here is that we get physical consequences so > > we can test that theory of consciousness. > > > > Only if you infer that propositions do more than serve as an inert > > mirror or lens of our rational projection. > > I don't see why. > > Because it is just as likely that the physical consequences have no unified subjective experience associated with them. > > > I don't see any reason to guess that ever happens, to the contrary, > > our experience is filled with examples of why the menu is not the > > meal, the map is not the territory, etc. > > Ah OK. That is again related to your non-comp assumption. Obviously, > bettiong on comp = betting that the brain or the programs is the real > thing, the semantical fixed point. You don't get a model of the brain > in your head, but a machine which is supposed to do the real thing, > that's comp: it is a place where we accept an intersection between the > ap and reality (actually like when a map is plunged into the > territory: there is a similar fixed point (the "you are here" point). > Right, but I can't bet on comp anymore. I see that the Emperor's thread count is lacking. If we bet that programs are real, then we lose any possibility that anything else is real and any likelihood that there would be anything else. > > > > > Bugs Bunny seems like he acts like a character because he is drawn > > and animated in such a way as to direct to our own private human > > experience of character, not because animation has convinced the > > cartoon itself to become conscious. > > A computer takes the counterfactuals into account. Not so for Bugs > Bunny. > Maybe that's just because he's only Bugs v. 1.0. You have to get to Bugs v. 1.9 before he can take counterfactuals into account. Craig > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/op2afKWmmQ8J. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.