On 22 Jan 2013, at 18:26, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, January 22, 2013 10:14:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jan 2013, at 18:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> On Monday, January 21, 2013 12:31:00 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Impossible, or comp is false. No machine can ever figure out that
> there is anything without postulating it by faith. The fact that
> such postulation is unconscious makes this counter-intuitive, but
> with comp it is provable with mathematical logic.
> Aha, now this is interesting. Here I can begin to see the sub-
> arithmetic sense that you are working with. By 'figure out', do you
> mean that a machine has a conscious experience of reasoning?

Not systematically. Only if she is universal, or perhaps she has to be
Löbian. I am still not sure on this.

> Or is the reasoning as unconscious as the faith upon which said
> reasoning must rely?

Hard to say. But most people (as this discussion actually illustrates)
are not aware that the idea of a primary universe is something that we
infer. It is not something that we live. It is unconscious theory. It
is obvious (by natiral selection) that it would be a waste of energy
and time to make this systematically conscious.

I think of the universe not so much as something we live or infer as just the ultimate context of consideration. Sort of the idea of the largest possible "here".

> Where does provability by mathematical logic come in?

I model the belief of an ideally correct machine by its provability
predicate. This is a predicate that we can translate in the language
of the machine (in arithmetic for example), an,d which obeys the usual
axiom for rational belief:
[](p -> q) -> ([]p -> []q)
[]p -> [][]p (for the "rich" machines).
Rules: modus ponens and necessitation (p/[]p).
In such a machine case, the machines (and all its consistent
extensions) will obey the Löb axioms: []([]p -> p) -> []p, which is
the building block of the comp hypostases.
In that frame work, the inferences in the proposition <>t, and more
generally of propositions in G* minus G, plays the role of
consciousness. But the inference itself is not conscious.

It only makes sense to me that propositions are a facet of conscious experience.

Not necessarily. Don't confuse the propositions and the content of the proposition.

I don't see that propositions, or words, or figures drawn on paper, or any other symbolic form would themselves play at consciousness.

Indeed, they don't. No more than SWE, or a book on black hole. Even neurons does not "play at" consciousness in the comp theory. They make it only relatively manifestable. Consciousness is already "beyond word". It is a mystical truth, yet quite common.

We might infer they are conscious, like a cartoon or puppet, but I don't see any reason to suspect that symbols would suddenly become actually conscious at some point because of complexity or scale.

What is conscious is the person making the inference (of a reality). Consciousness is not the inference, not the symbols used, etc. Consciousness is in the knowledge of the person, and that is non computably associated to infinities of computations. But it can obeys laws, and be described with a theory, or a meta-theory, because consciousness has no formal term to refer to it. Like arithmetical truth has no term to refer to it in arithmetic. that is why modal logic is useful, as it makes possible to talk about things which have no descriptions.

> Why doesn't everything use unconscious faith

Faith is always conscious. The inference itself might be or not
unconscious, so I guess what you mean. If I said "unconscious faith",
I meant "unconscious inference of something" and the "unconscious"
bears on "inference", not on the content of the faith.

Ok, I can see where an inference would be unavailable to personal consciousness (I call this perceptual inertia - expectations become backgrounded and implicit) but because we are organisms with particularly elaborate consciousness, I would not rule out that what has become less than conscious to us at the personal level is still conscious on sub-personal levels.

I tend to believe this, actually. But not really from my reflexion of comp, but from my reading of books on brains, and then my reading of salvia reports (and other plants). I tend to think that our consciousness result from the association of at least a dozen of "already conscious beings" integrated in some way. some drugs dissociates those "presence". Amazingly some presence might not been in the brain, but in arithmetic, to which our brain is naturally connected.

It is an open problem to relate this with the 8 hypostases. Normally only two of them "experience consciousness" (S4Grz1 and the X1*). But things can be more complex.

Sub-conscious to 'us', but conscious to whatever community of sub- selves insist within us.

I can be quite OK with this.

You would call these machines, but I would say that their mechanistic qualities are a function of the subordinate relation. What we don't relate to personally is perceived through a filter of impersonality. Add to that that there may indeed be, in an absolute sense, less degrees of freedom on the sub-personal levels as they extend into the inorganic levels of description - which is where we find the protocols of arithmetic.

Hmm... here we might differ. But this comes, I guess from on difference on comp.

Side note - The idea of this sliding scale of personal identification can be applied to typical gender relations, as there is a somewhat exceptional role that gender plays in the sense of being both objectified due to social-biological unfamiliarity but also charged with overly subjective archetypal association. A tendency to feel that members of the opposite sex are presented as both deeply 'within' us and at the same time far outside of us.


> or how does unconscious faith become conscious only to become
> partially obscured once again and in need of proof to restore it to
> consciousness?

No need of proof as there is none. That consciousness comes, and quit
is usual. You are quite conscious of driving when being a young
driver, then most of the driving become unconscious when older ...
until you get a problem with the car and are conscious again.
Consciousness is related to focusing attention, notably.

I agree, focusing attention is probably the primordial motor capacity in the universe. Participation in its rawest form begins with the ability to express a personal preference of one perceptual opportunity over another, or, at least in the case of humans, to create a new opportunity altogether.


> It seems like the forces which are shaping faith into these
> different qualities of consciousness are actually the more relevant
> agents.

With comp, forces are a product of consciousness.

Why aren't they the product of computation?

By UDA. The forces are physical (F=ma), or related to physical (love). They emerge from the competition of infinities of universal machines emulating the more fine grained (with respect to the comp substitution level) computations leading to our comp state. It comes from the first person indeterminacy; the global one on the whole UD* or arithmetic.

> What would be the reason for or method of bringing a machine's
> unconscious faith into a conscious experiential mode?

The machine is conscious when she infer <>t and other G*\ G-
propositions (true but non provable/believable).

This seems to be a very narrow expectation of consciousness. When any organism "Wakes up", they become conscious,

They can be conscious also in sleep, even in non REM sleep. Waking up will only correlate that consciousness with a sharable computation. But yes, when you wake up, you are usually conscious (although some need to get enough coffee to correlate the consciousness with some possible reality:)

but I do not see that the criteria of being able to "infer <>t and other G*\ G- propositions" is either necessary or sufficient to explain the experience of waking up.

Because when you wake up, you will put your feet on the ground and you will infer (unconsciously) that your feet will not go through the ground. Somehow you bet on a reality which satisfy your desire (walking, drinking coffee, etc.). You bet on a "reality", and this can be explained to be equivalent with betting in self-consistency (it is easy if we limit the language of the machine, and tricky in the general case: I usually simplify a bit the language of the machine to prove this, to be honest).

This confers to her
an ability to evolve, to change her mind, to speed-up its
computability abilities, to focuse attention, to differentiate on
different consistent extensions, etc. Of course there a tuns of open
problems. the advantage here is that we get physical consequences so
we can test that theory of consciousness.

Only if you infer that propositions do more than serve as an inert mirror or lens of our rational projection.

I don't see why.

I don't see any reason to guess that ever happens, to the contrary, our experience is filled with examples of why the menu is not the meal, the map is not the territory, etc.

Ah OK. That is again related to your non-comp assumption. Obviously, bettiong on comp = betting that the brain or the programs is the real thing, the semantical fixed point. You don't get a model of the brain in your head, but a machine which is supposed to do the real thing, that's comp: it is a place where we accept an intersection between the ap and reality (actually like when a map is plunged into the territory: there is a similar fixed point (the "you are here" point).

Bugs Bunny seems like he acts like a character because he is drawn and animated in such a way as to direct to our own private human experience of character, not because animation has convinced the cartoon itself to become conscious.

A computer takes the counterfactuals into account. Not so for Bugs Bunny.



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