On Tue, Feb 5, 2013 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 04 Feb 2013, at 23:21, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > > On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 7:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 02 Feb 2013, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Feb 1, 2013 at 6:11 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 01 Feb 2013, at 09:46, Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >>> Hi Bruno, >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 31 Jan 2013, at 15:15, Roger Clough wrote: >>>> >>>> Hi Telmo Menezes >>>> >>>> Perhaps you're right, but to my limited knowledge, >>>> a quantum has infinite paths available between >>>> points A and B without invoking another universe. >>>> >>>> >>>> Once we are able to use (classical) information obtained in the other >>>> quantum paths, like when doing a Fourier transform on some superposition >>>> of many computations, like in a quantum computer, what makes them different >>>> of other universes? >>>> >>> >>> The superposition of many computations itself. Superposition of states >>> on a same universe are a bit hard to swallow. I think people reject the >>> idea of a multiverse because it sounds loony, but my understanding is that >>> making QM consistent with a single universe requires magical thinking. >>> >>> >>> OK. >>> >>> >>> It's the same as saying that consciousness emerges from neural activity. >>> People overlook the magical step because they are more confortable with the >>> resulting model. >>> >>> >>> Totally OK. UDA and MGA are supposed to make that magic step quite >>> palatable. >>> >> >> But UDA and MGA propose that consciousness supervenes on neural states, >> not that it emerges or is caused by them, correct? >> >> >> >> UDA (including MGA = step 8) shows that comp (I can survive a digital >> brain transplant) entails that eventually the brains and bodies supervene >> on sequences of computational states, which are actually arithmetical >> relation. (having chosen arithmetic for the ontology, anything Turing >> universal theorey will do). >> >> MGA throws out the physical supervenience thesis: the idea that >> consciousness relies on this or that (physical or not) implementations of a >> computations. Consciousness is associated to all computation in arithmetic. >> This can be related with the first person indeterminacy. >> > > Ok, I'm more familiar with the UDA than the MGA. > > > > If you are interested, I will come back on this soon. Perhaps not on this > list(*). > I will tell here when I will come back on MGA on the FOAR list. > I am, cool. > > (*) MGA has already been discussed on this list: > http://old.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html > I think I was there around that time, but possibly stressing with writing my thesis. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Naturalism used magic without saying, but our brains is gifted for this, >>> and that makes sense in the evolutive struggle of life. >>> >>> I think we agree, >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So no problem. >>>> >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>>> *Time:* 2013-01-31, 08:13:30 >>>> *Subject:* Re: Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>> >>>> Hi Roger, >>>> >>>> In the one universe model, where does the extra computational power of >>>> quantum computers come from? >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Roger Clough <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi Telmo Menezes >>>>> IMHO more than one universe is unjustified. >>>>> >>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>>>> *Time:* 2013-01-30, 12:10:08 >>>>> *Subject:* Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>>> >>>>> Hi Roger, >>>>> >>>>> I find it harder to believe in finite universes. Why the precise >>>>> number, whatever it is? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 12:46 PM, Roger Clough >>>>> <[email protected]>wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Stephen P. King >>>>>> It's easier to believe in salvation through faith or UFOs than >>>>>> infinite universes. >>>>>> >>>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>>> *From:* Stephen P. King <[email protected]> >>>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>>>>> *Time:* 2013-01-28, 09:20:33 >>>>>> *Subject:* About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>>>> >>>>>> Hi, >>>>>> >>>>>> 牋 I think this paper might be fodder for a nice discussion! >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295 >>>>>> >>>>>> About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space >>>>>> Francisco Jos Soler >>>>>> Gil<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Gil_F/0/1/0/all/0/1> >>>>>> , Manuel >>>>>> Alfonseca<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Alfonseca_M/0/1/0/all/0/1> >>>>>> (Submitted on 22 Jan 2013 (v1 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295v1>), >>>>>> last revised 23 Jan 2013 (this version, v2)) >>>>>> >>>>>> This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and >>>>>> Brundrit, based on classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga >>>>>> and Vilenkin, based on the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics, both >>>>>> of >>>>>> which conclude that, in an infinite universe, planets and living beings >>>>>> must be repeated an infinite number of times. We point to some possible >>>>>> shortcomings in the arguments of these authors. We conclude that the idea >>>>>> of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be considered >>>>>> strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and cosmology. Such >>>>>> ideas should be seen rather as examples of {\guillemotleft}ironic >>>>>> science{\guillemotright} in the terminology of John Horgan. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> Onward! >>>>>> >>>>>> Stephen >>>>>> >>>>>> ____________________________________________________________________ >>>>>> *DreamMail* - The first mail software supporting source tracking >>>>>> www.dreammail.org >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> Visit this group at >>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything 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stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en >>> . >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at 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