On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote: > When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an > assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a > proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group > of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are > arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given > condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what > the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with. >
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper. I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far. But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(. Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
