On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an 
> assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a 
> proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group 
> of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are 
> arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given 
> condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what 
> the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.

I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.



Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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