On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:46, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.

I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.

I'm happy for Bp&  p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.

Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.

Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".

As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order to count as knowledge.

We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor in platonism.

I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects accidental beliefs that happen to be true.

So we might agree. I don't see how any belief can be accidental in comp, given that a (rational) belief is defined by what a machine can assert for logical reason. That's the B part of Bp (& p).

The example he gives is Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick up a new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue. In fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to drive that day. So does Bob know that Bill bought a blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did?

He believes wrongly. That distinction is important for the study of natural languages, but not for the theology and physics. I avoid that problem by restricting myself to ideally correct machines, where the important distonction is between Bp and Bp & p, with Bp implying p at the meta-level (G*).

From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure

I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected belief can be false. The problem is in explicating what constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases.

OK. In comp "causally" is a very high level feature, not something which can be explained by the physical realm, which emerges from the low levels. In the low level we don't need causality. Implication is enough.



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