On 13 Feb 2013, at 02:28, Russell Standish wrote:

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On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we aremaking anassumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we lookclosely, aproposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing buta groupof sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no givencondition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent uponwhatthe experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me uncomfortable, post Popper.

`That is why I like to sum up Popper by "in Science there are only`

`belief, never knowledge per se".`

`It is related to the modesty/Löbianity of the correct machines, and`

`the fact that the genuine mystical machines are mute on their knowledge.`

`Unfortunately this leads to vocabulary problem (only) for some`

`Popperians.`

I'm happy for Bp & p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.

`Well, actually it was a problem that Bp & p could work for Bp = "I`

`prove p", because most scientists believe that this makes knowledge`

`equivalent with belief or proof for/by the correct machine.`

`It takes some understanding of Gödel's theorem to realize that, even`

`for the correct machine, and despite the fact that Bp is equivalent`

`with Bp & p (prove the same arithmetical p), they obey different`

`logics. So only G* proves Bp <-> Bp & p, the machine, nor G, can't`

`prove that equivalence, and this makes Bp & p obeying a different`

`logic (indeed the modal logic S4 defining the classical notion of`

`knowledge).`

`A machine cannot prove that Bf is equivalent with Bf & f, without`

`contradicting Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.`

But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modifyTheatetus :(.

`In "conscience and mécanisme" I argue in detail that the acceptance of`

`the classical theory of knowledge (S4) which we get back by applying`

`Theaetetus' definition of knowledge on Gödel's provability predicate)`

`is the only one which can make sense of the "dream argument" in`

`metaphysics. We can know that we are dreaming, but we cannot know`

`that we are awake, and that is a key to get the platonist idea that we`

`might be in a sort of cave/matrix (in the digital setting).`

Bruno

Cheers -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.

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