On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.
I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.
But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify
Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.
Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal logic
S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic S4Grz1,
and it works very well. It even makes the knower unnameable and close
to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner God".
As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes' as
in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he argued
that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the
proposition in order to count as knowledge.
We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp, nor
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:
"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments in
contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem owes
its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund Gettier,
called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it, Gettier proposed
two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and
belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not
have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck
Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)
I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects
accidental beliefs that happen to be true. The example he gives is
Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick up a
new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the parking
lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue. In fact it is
blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a blue loaner to
drive that day. So does Bob know that Bill bought a blue car, or does
he only believe, truly that he did?
From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means that
Gettier believes that we can know things for sure
I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected belief
can be false. The problem is in explicating what constitutes
'causally connected' in complicated cases.
WTF is a "causally connected belief "? I see something related to
the idea in this paper
but Causality is a concept that is on intimate terms with Time. No?
and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at
least, that we can know that we are awake, or that our communicable
knowledge is secure, but with comp that is impossible. With comp we
can be sure of our consciousness only, but that knowledge is
typically not communicable.
And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but
only hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal case
of simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the physics
(quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.
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