On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.
I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too far.
But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify Theatetus :(.
Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge. As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B
stands for 'believes' as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he
argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of the proposition in order
to count as knowledge.
Brent
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