On 13 Feb 2013, at 23:08, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 2/13/2013 2:46 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 8:04 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 03:03, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/12/2013 5:28 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Feb 12, 2013 at 11:05:37AM -0800, Craig Weinberg wrote:
When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we
are making an
assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look
closely, a
proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing
but a group
of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n) which
we are
arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no
given
condition in actual experience. All experiences are contingent
upon what
the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.
I don't really follow your remaining comments, but I agree with
you
that the p in the Theatetical definition of knowledge makes me
uncomfortable, post Popper.
I'm happy for Bp& p to apply to mathematical knowledge, with B
semantically equivalent to "prove", but when it comes to
scientific
knowledge, requiring absolute truth in things seems a step too
far.
But I have no constructive suggestions as to how to modify
Theatetus :(.
Intuitively Bp & p does not define knowledge.
Why? It obeys to the classical theory of knowledge (the modal
logic S4), and in the comp context, we get the more stronger logic
S4Grz1, and it works very well. It even makes the knower
unnameable and close to the Plotinus "universal soul" or "inner
God".
As Edmund Gettier pointed out Bp, where B stands for 'believes'
as in non-mathematical discourse, can be accidental. Hence he
argued that the belief must be causally connected to the fact of
the proposition in order to count as knowledge.
We have already discussed this. Edmund Gettier seems to accept a
notion of knowledge which makes just no sense, neither in comp,
nor in platonism.
From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem we read:
"A Gettier problem is any one of a category of thought experiments
in contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of
knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). The category of problem
owes its name to a three-page paper published in 1963, by Edmund
Gettier, called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". In it,
Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria
(justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the
majority of readers would not have felt that the result was
knowledge due to the element of luck involved."
Bruno's notion involves betting, so luck is a factor! ;-)
Not with Bp & p. The betting is for observation, not knowledge. The
betting is handled with Bp & Dt & p. Somehow, we impose the
consistency: that is, for machine talking first person logic, the
existence of at least one reality (Dt).
(By Gödel's completeness theorem (not incompleteness !) we have that
Dt is true iff "B" has a model (a mathematical reality "satisfying"
his beliefs)). Bp & Dt (& p) makes p true in all the accessible
realities in the neighborhood, so the "p" has measure one, and the
corresponding logic is the logic of the "probability" one.
Bruno
I don't know what notion of knowledge he accepts, but he rejects
accidental beliefs that happen to be true. The example he gives is
Bob and Bill work together. Bob knows that Bill has gone to pick
up a new car he bought. He sees Bill drive a new blue car into the
parking lot and concludes that the car Bill bought is blue. In
fact it is blue, but it wasn't ready and so the dealer gave Bill a
blue loaner to drive that day. So does Bob know that Bill bought a
blue car, or does he only believe, truly that he did?
From my reflection about the dream-argument, it probably means
that Gettier believes that we can know things for sure
I don't think that follows that all. Even a causally connected
belief can be false. The problem is in explicating what
constitutes 'causally connected' in complicated cases.
WTF is a "causally connected belief "? I see something related
to the idea in this paper but Causality is a concept that is on
intimate terms with Time. No?
Brent
and communicate them as such, making him believe implicitly, at
least, that we can know that we are awake, or that our
communicable knowledge is secure, but with comp that is
impossible. With comp we can be sure of our consciousness only,
but that knowledge is typically not communicable.
And the belief does not need to be accidental, and hopefully (but
only hopefully) is not. And it is never accidental for the ideal
case of simpler machine than us, that we need to study to get the
physics (quanta and qualia) from the numbers relations.
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
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