On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:44, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 12:46:23 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2013, at 17:35, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Wouldn’t Simulated Intelligence be a more appropriate term than Artificial Intelligence?

A better term would be "natural imagination". But terms are not important.

Except that we already have natural imagination, so what would we be developing? Replacing something with itself?

Yes. That's what life does all the time.

The distinction between artificial and natural is artificial. Human made. And so it is also natural, as all creatures tend to do that by developing their ego.

Machines are just a collateral branch of life. Cars and houses are not less natural than ribosomes and mitochondria.

Thinking of it objectively, if we have a program which can model a hurricane, we would call that hurricane a simulation, not an ‘artificial hurricane’. If we modeled any physical substance, force, or field, we would similarly say that we had simulated hydrogen or gravity or electromagnetism, not that we had created artificial hydrogen, gravity, etc.

Assuming those things exist.

Whether they exist or not, the mathematically generated model of X is simulated X. It could be artificial X as well, but whether X is natural or artificial only tells us the nature of its immediate developers.

It depends on how you defined Hurricane, and different definition will make different sense in different theories.

By calling it artificial, we also emphasize a kind of obsolete notion of natural vs man-made as categories of origin. If we used simulated instead, the measure of intelligence would be framed more modestly as the degree to which a system meets our expectations (or what we think or assume are our expectations). Rather than assuming a universal index of intelligent qualities which is independent from our own human qualities, we could evaluate the success of a particular Turing emulation purely on its merits as a convincing reflection of intelligence rather than presuming to have replicated an organic conscious experience mechanically.

Comp assumes we are Turing emulable,

Which is why Comp fails. Not only are we not emulable, emulation itself is not primitively real - it is a subjective consensus of expectations.

It is a well defined arithmetical notion, which comp assumes.

and in that case we can be emulated, trivially.

Comp can't define us,

That's correct.

so it can only emulate the postage stamp sized sampling of some of our most exposed, and least meaningful surfaces.

You can't know this. We have to bet on some level, and cannot be sure it is correct. But the consequences of comp are extracted from the mere existence of the subst level, not from the (impossible) knowledge of it.

Comp is a stencil or silhouette maker. No amount of silhouettes pieced together and animated in a sequence can generate an interior experience.

You can't say that publicly. You can't pretend to know that. It is your non-comp *hypothesis*.

If it did, we would only have to draw a cartoon and it would come to life on its own.

That's a non sense. Even for doing something as "simple" as Watson or big blue, it takes a lot of work.

To assume this being not possible assume the existence of infinite process playing relevant roles in the mind or in life. But it is up to you to motivates for them. The problem, for you, is that you have to speculate on something that we have not yet observed. You can't say "consciousness", as this would just beg the question.

It is consciousness, and it is not begging the question, since all possible questions supervene on consciousness. Not sure what you mean about infinite processes or why they would mean that simulations can become experiences on their own.

Because any processes finitely describable is trivially Turing emulable.

The cost of losing the promise of imminently mastering awareness would, I think, be outweighed by the gain of a more scientifically circumspect approach.

Invoking infinities is not so much circumspect, especially for driving negative statement about the consciousness of possible entities.

What infinities do you refer to?

The special one you need to make sense of non-comp.

Putting the Promethean dream on hold, we could guard against the shadow of its confirmation bias. My concern is that without such a precaution, the promise of machine intelligence as a stage 1 simulacrum (a faithful copy of an original, in Baudrillard’s terms), will be diluted to a stage 3 simulacrum (a copy that masks the absence of a profound reality, where the simulacrum pretends to be a faithful copy.)

Assuming a non comp theory, like the quite speculative theory of mind by Penrose. Your own proposl fits remarkably ith comp, and some low level of substitution, it seems to me (we have already discussed this).

Sense contains comp, by definition, but a comp world cannot generate, support, or benefit by sense in any way as far as I can tell.

There is no comp world. Comp is an assumption. It assumes that the brain is Turing emulable, meaning that consciousness is maintained. Then whatever reality is, it is NOT computational. Arithmetic, with the big A, is already not computational, not axiomatizable, and quite beyond us. And necessarily so when we assume comp.

Comp does not just contradict materialism. It contradicts the 19th century conception of machines and numbers. Even just its "Church's thesis" part does that. We don't know what numbers are, still less what they are capable of, still less what they are not capable of.



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