On 13 Feb 2013, at 21:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, February 13, 2013 10:56:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 12 Feb 2013, at 20:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:

When we talk about a Bp, relating to consciousness is that we are making an assumption about what a proposition is. In fact, if we look closely, a proposition can only be another level of B. p is really nothing but a group of sub-personal Beliefs (logarithmically nested as B^n)


If I understand it correctly:

If Bp = 'The belief that China is in Asia',

With that example, p is for the fact that China is in Asia.

then p = 'China is in Asia'.

No. It is that China is in Asia. p represents some truth (or falsity), like 2+3 =6. It does not represent some sentence used for referring to that fact. If we could define a truth predicate, it would be equivalent with TRUE('p'). But such truth predicate does not exist, so we use the sentence itself, to denote the fact.

What I'm saying is that "p" is really hundreds of millions of experiences in which the location of China is referenced, visually, verbally, cognitively.

I do not use it in that sense.

The p is the inertia of those implicit memories, balanced against the absence of any counterfactual experiences. Each one of those memories, thoughts, and images is itself a lower level 'Bp'. I might imagine a composite image of a generic world map in my mind, where China is represented as a green bulge in Asia. That image is a Bp: 'China is shaped like this (China shape) and is part of the shape called Asia'. There is no objective p condition of China being in Asia which is independent of all experiences. It is the Bp experiences, direct and indirect, of China and Asia which define every possible p about China being in Asia.


which we are arbitrarily considered as a given condition...but there is no given condition in actual experience.

That's why we put Bp & p. To get the condition of 1p experience. It works as we get a non nameable, and non formalisable notion of knowledge. S4 and S4Grz do succeed in meta-formalizing a thoroughly non formalisable notion.

I don't know what that means. If notions are non nameable and non formalisable, it doesn't have to mean that they are all the same notion.

It means that when we apply the definition of knowledge given by Theaetetus, we get a modal logic of knowledge, and more, it verifies some property accepted for Plotinus' "inner God" or "universal soul". In particular, that "first person notion is not a 3p-machine.

All experiences are contingent upon what the experiencer is capable of receiving or interacting with.

Any proposition that can be named relies on some pre-existing context (which is sensed or makes sense).

The problem with applying Doxastic models to consciousness is not only that it amputates the foundations of awareness,

It does not for the reason above. Note that even Bp & p can lead to falsity, in principle. Things get more complex when you add the non monotonic layers, that we need for natural languages and for the mundane type of belief or knowledge. Here, of course, with the goal of deriving the correct physical laws; it is simpler to consider the case of ideally correct machine, for which us, but not the machine itself can know the equivalence.


You might try to understand UDA before trying to see how the antic knowledge notions can translate UDA in arithmetic, and be used to recover physics, in the way UDA asks us to proceed.

"Bp & p" has certainly major defect for human knowledge, but to derive physics we need only the case of ideally arithmetically-correct machine, as we search the universal comp-correct physics, not some human non correct physics.



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