On 05 Mar 2013, at 18:21, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Monday, March 4, 2013 7:23:32 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Mar 2013, at 20:35, meekerdb wrote:
> On 3/2/2013 11:56 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>> So you admit that what you say contradicts the fact that you are
>>> >intentionally saying it?
>> "Intentional", as far as I can understand its use in philosophy, is
>> more or less equivalent to "mental" or "conscious". You seem to
take
>> it as an a priori fact that something that is either
deterministic or
>> random cannot have intentionality. This seems to me obviously
wrong.
>
> Me too. Intentionality just consists in having a hierarchy of goals
> which drive actions. To say something is done intentionally just
> means it is done pursuant to some goal. When the Mars rover steers
> around rock it does so intentionally in order to reach some place
> beyond which is a higher level goal.
I agree too, but of course some non-computationalist will argue that
"intention" needs consciousness (which i think is wrong),
Individually, one might carry out an intention without being
personally conscious of it, but ontologically, a world without
consciousness can have no intention - why would it? What would it
mean for something to be intentional or unintentional in a universe
which contains no possibility of conscious participation?
It can be a matter of definition. But when you instruct a machine with
some high level goal (like surviving), she can build by herself
derived goal and develop intention, yet non necessarily in a conscious
way.
and that
goal driven algorithm can be non conscious (which i think is
possible).
An algorithm can be non conscious (it always is IMO), but an
algorithm has no intention to pursue a goal.
What drives an algorithm is not a goal but the mechanics of whatever
it is executed on.
As I said, some actual algorithm works by building their own goal. A
goal can be a subgoal in a tree of goals. The basic goall can be very
general, like fight against the fire. The algorithm will build
subgoal, like finding water, etc.
Besides you might say that what driven a human is not his goal, but
the mechanics of life. You don't give any criteria to distinguish a
human from a complex machine.
Whether it is the force of water dripping on a scale, or current
winding through a circuit, pendulum swinging, etc - that sensory-
motor expectation is the only intention. Everything that we place in
the line of that intention - water wheels, dominoes, etc, is
unintentional to the process completing.
Which explains why you need to introduce consciousness in matter, but
once you do that, why does it not operate in silicon, why only in
carbon?
I can make a Rube Goldberg machine which drops a mallet on a bunny's
head at the end, but that doesn't mean that the machine
intentionally hurts animals. This is what it seems like you don't
see or are denying. Just because an algorithm is designed
purposefully doesn't mean that purpose is carried into the algorithm.
Of course. But this does not show that purpose is not itself
mechanical. You beg systematically the question.
I am a bit astonished that some people still believe that
indeterminacy can help for free will. On the contrary, deterministic
free will make sense, because free will comes from a lack of self-
determinacy,
Why do you conceive of free will as emerging from an absence?
Without some absence of satisfaction, you get no goal at all, and
without goal, no purpose, and without purpose no free will.
Adding randomness can give a look of free will, but it is not.
Bruno
That's like saying that white comes from not-black. Why would
something develop free will just because it has a lack of self-
determinacy? Jellyfish drift.
Craig
implying hesitation in front of different path, and self-
indeterminacy follows logically from determinism and self-reference.
First person indeterminacy can be used easily to convince oneself that
indeterminacy cannot help for free will. Iterating a self-duplication
can't provide free-will.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
