On 3/8/2013 4:33 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, March 8, 2013 1:35:12 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

    On 07 Mar 2013, at 17:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

    On Thursday, March 7, 2013 8:19:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:

        On 06 Mar 2013, at 18:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:

        I understand where you are coming from in MGA now, Bruno,
        and again there is nothing wrong with your reasoning, but in
        that your initial assumptions are not the universe that we
        live in.


        (the assumption of the whole reasoning is just comp. Then in
        MGA i make some local assumption to make a point, but they
        are discharged before getting the conclusion).

    Right. It's the comp where the assumptions are which don't match
    our universe.

    "our universe"? That's more an object of enquiry than a something
    I would take for granted.

I don't find the notion of a shared universe especially controversial. What leads you to draw away from it?

    I don't have any particular problem with what you add to it - you
    make perfect sense if comp were true... but comp can't be true,
    so it doesn't matter.

    You say often that comp can't be true, but when will you say no to
    a doctor proposing very little protheses in the brain, and then
    bigger one.

I would feel the same about replacing body parts. The more that's being replaced, the more I want to say no.

Hi Craig,

You might enjoy the anime series and manga Ghost in a Shell <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ghost_in_the_Shell>. It explores this question.

    Also, nothing in the brain seems to be not Turing emulable.

Nothing that is examined with Turing emulable instruments can seem other than Turing emulable. Once we engage in the world as a body, and uses instruments which extend our body's sense organs, then we have amplified our instrumental view of the world as public-objects-divided-by-space. What is gained is gained at the expense of our natural orientation as private-experiences-united-through-time, which atrophies under our own reflected gaze as outsiders. Indeed, once you map the self as a brain, then the map fits into any other map, but you can't get that map back into a self without losing the Turing emulable knowledge and control. They are mutually exclusive, just as private and public are mutually exclusive.

    Comp is without doubt a strong hypothesis, with counter-intuitive

The consequences don't bother me, Comp just happens to be incorrect because it mistakes forms and functions for that which experiences and participates through forms and functions.

    but non-comp is a vague label for theories which are never
    presented. As I try to explain, many things you say make sense
    from a computationalist perspective, so it is weird you believe so
    much that comp can't be true.

Non-comp is a weird label...sounds like it must have been coined by Comp fanciers. Something like 'Natural' sounds better to me. Before we imagined that we could stitch a living mind on a very large pillowcase, we imagined that we were natural persons, irreducible to smaller parts.



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