On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 28 Mar 2013, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> On Thu, Mar 28, 2013 at 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 26 Mar 2013, at 18:19, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>> On 3/26/2013 4:21 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> I can explain why if a machine can have experience and enough >>> reflexivity, >>> then the machine can already understand that she cannot justify >>> rationally >>> the presence of its experience. No machine, nor us, can ever see how that >>> could be true. It *is* in the range of the non communicable. >>> >>> If some aliens decide that we are not conscious, we will not find any >>> test >>> to prove them wrong. >>> >>> >>> And if we decide the Mars Rover is conscious, can any test prove us >>> wrong? >>> >>> >>> Yes. But it is longer to explain than for comp. Strong AI is refutable in >>> a >>> weaker sense than comp. The refutation here are indirect and based on the >>> acceptance of the classical tgeory of knowledge, that is S4 (not >>> necessarily >>> Theaetetus). >>> >>> >>> >>> Or if Craig decides an atom is conscious, can any test prove him wrong? >>> >>> >>> A person can be conscious. What would it mean that an atom is conscious? >>> What is an atom? >>> >>> >> >> Davies suggests that the threshold for consciousness based on the >> Lloyd limit is the complexity of the human cell. > > > In which physics?
Holographic (Bekenstein bound) physics of 10^120 bits (the Lloyd limit) >If he assumes comp, he must derive that physics first, to > get a valid consequences. Davies does not assume comp. I thought I did in my paper. > BTW I don't see the use of comp in your paper. I certainly discuss physics derived from comp in my paper (http://vixra.org/abs/1303.0194) while leaving out all the math details. ie. CY manifolds->math->mind/physics-> matter Could you expand when you have time how I do not use comp? What I do is to place resource limits on comp (10^120 bits for the universe and perhaps 10^1000 for the Metaverse). Is that perhaps what you refer to? Or is it the conjecture that CY manifolds are the comp machine, one for the universe and another for the metaverse? Thanks for reading the paper. Richard > > Now, I can accept that human cells have already some consciousness. Even > bacteria. I dunno but I am open to the idea. Bacteria have already full > Turing universality, and exploit it in complex genetic regulation control. > > Comp is open with a strict Moore law: the number of angels (or bit > processing) that you can put at the top of a needle might be unbounded. Like > Feynman said, there is room in the bottom. But we might have insuperable > read and write problems. There might be computer in which we can upload our > minds, but never came back. > > Bruno > > > > > >> >>> >>> >>> Which I think is John Clark's point: Consciousness is easy. Intelligence >>> is >>> hard. >>> >>> >>> >>> Consciousness might be more easy than intelligence, and certainly than >>> matter. Consciousness is easy with UDA, when you get the difference >>> between >>> both G and G*, and between Bp, Bp & p, Bp & Dt, etc. (AUDA). >>> >>> Matter is more difficult. Today we have only the propositional >>> observable. >>> >>> Intelligence, in my opinion is rather easy too. It is a question of >>> "abstract thermodynamic", intelligence is when you get enough heat while >>> young, something like that. It is close to courage, and it is what make >>> competence possible. >>> >>> Competence is the most difficult, as they are distributed on transfinite >>> lattice of incomparable degrees. Some can ask for necessary long work, >>> and >>> can have negative feedback on intelligence. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >>> >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
