We should add that computationalism postulates that consciousness is a process that can be exactly specified by a recursively enumerable function. No?
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 1:16 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/13/2013 5:41 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 7:05 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 5/12/2013 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>> >>> >>> If your mom ate something different while pregnant with you, such that >>> you >>> developed with different atoms, does that mean someone else would have >>> been >>> born in your place and you wouldn't be conscious? Or if one unexpressed >>> gene was different, would it be someone other than you looking through >>> those >>> eyes? What if one gene were different, but it was of little >>> consequence, or >>> what if multiple genes were different, etc. How much of the >>> circumstances >>> would have to change for you to never have been born? If you admit that >>> different matter or different genes would not make it such that you were >>> never born, then are you not all your siblings as well? >>> >>> >>> That doesn't follow. The most common theory of why you are you is that >>> the >>> structure of your brain and body encode computations that are peculiar to >>> you. You are determined by the structure that effects these >>> computations. >>> This is independent of the particular atoms and molecules and even a lot >>> of >>> the structure. As Bruno puts it, it depends on the level of >>> substitution. >>> Just because there is a level, e.g. atoms, that makes no difference, it >>> doesn't follow that there is not a difference at another level. >>> >> It's hard to have this discussion with a single word for "you". 1p-you >> and 3p-you might make it easier. The 3p-you is characterised by a >> number of physical processes that we more or less understand. For >> example, if I fall and lose a bit of skin from my knee that won't >> change much, but there is possible a relatively small set of neurons >> that can be changed to alter my personality. But the idea that the >> 1p-you is determined at a substitution level seems silly to me >> > > I said it was the most common theory. Not that it was right. > Computationalism is the theory that there is no substitution level which > doesn't instantiate you1 so long as the computation is the same. > > > (unless >> we can find some fundamental process by which the 1p arises). >> Otherwise, I find it easier to believe that there is only one 1p >> conscious entity that gets instantiated on everyone (and possible >> everything), at all times, in all possible universes. >> > > Even assuming computationalism there can be different computations and > hence different 1p. As I understand Bruno's theory, consciousness is not > an entity, it's described by a relation between threads of computation. > > Brent > > > >> Telmo. >> >> Brent >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >>> email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>> . >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>> . >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/** > topic/everything-list/K7E-**Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en> > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> > . > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
