We should add that computationalism postulates that consciousness is a
process that can be exactly specified by a recursively enumerable function.
No?


On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 1:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> On 5/13/2013 5:41 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 7:05 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>> On 5/12/2013 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> If your mom ate something different while pregnant with you, such that
>>> you
>>> developed with different atoms, does that mean someone else would have
>>> been
>>> born in your place and you wouldn't be conscious?  Or if one unexpressed
>>> gene was different, would it be someone other than you looking through
>>> those
>>> eyes?  What if one gene were different, but it was of little
>>> consequence, or
>>> what if multiple genes were different, etc.  How much of the
>>> circumstances
>>> would have to change for you to never have been born?  If you admit that
>>> different matter or different genes would not make it such that you were
>>> never born, then are you not all your siblings as well?
>>>
>>>
>>> That doesn't follow.  The most common theory of why you are you is that
>>> the
>>> structure of your brain and body encode computations that are peculiar to
>>> you.  You are determined by the structure that effects these
>>> computations.
>>> This is independent of the particular atoms and molecules and even a lot
>>> of
>>> the structure.  As Bruno puts it, it depends on the level of
>>> substitution.
>>> Just because there is a level, e.g. atoms, that makes no difference, it
>>> doesn't follow that there is not a difference at another level.
>>>
>> It's hard to have this discussion with a single word for "you". 1p-you
>> and 3p-you might make it easier. The 3p-you is characterised by a
>> number of physical processes that we more or less understand. For
>> example, if I fall and lose a bit of skin from my knee that won't
>> change much, but there is possible a relatively small set of neurons
>> that can be changed to alter my personality. But the idea that the
>> 1p-you is determined at a substitution level seems silly to me
>>
>
> I said it was the most common theory.  Not that it was right.
> Computationalism is the theory that there is no substitution level which
> doesn't instantiate you1 so long as the computation is the same.
>
>
>  (unless
>> we can find some fundamental process by which the 1p arises).
>> Otherwise, I find it easier to believe that there is only one 1p
>> conscious entity that gets instantiated on everyone (and possible
>> everything), at all times, in all possible universes.
>>
>
> Even assuming computationalism there can be different computations and
> hence different 1p.  As I understand Bruno's theory, consciousness is not
> an entity, it's described by a relation between threads of computation.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>  Brent
>>>
>>> --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>>> "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>>> email to 
>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
>>> .
>>> To post to this group, send email to 
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>>> .
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**
>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en>
>>> .
>>> For more options, visit 
>>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out>
>>> .
>>>
>>>
>>>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the
> Google Groups "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/**
> topic/everything-list/K7E-**Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en>
> .
> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to
> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com>
> .
> To post to this group, send email to 
> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> .
> Visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en>
> .
> For more options, visit 
> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out>
> .
>
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to