Does the UD compute *all* functions or only those that are recursively enumerable? AFAIK, the latter, as a set, has a measure zero as a subset of the former. This is one reason why I worry about the viability of UDA (and AUDA), it postulates a severely restricted subset of the possible functions as ontologically primitive without a good argument as to why. Just because we finite mortals can only counts in terms of natural numbers is not an argument that All-that-Exists is limited to that standard. Man is NOT the measure of all things!
On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 2:02 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > I don't know. It would seem you would want to believe that if you were > going to say "yes" to the doctor, since the doctor is relying functionalism > to ensure the replacement works. But Bruno's UD computes all functions and > he theorizes that 1p consciousness consists of a sequence of states in this > computation, if I understand him correctly. > > Brent > > > > On 5/13/2013 10:39 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > We should add that computationalism postulates that consciousness is a > process that can be exactly specified by a recursively enumerable function. > No? > > > On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 1:16 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 5/13/2013 5:41 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >>> On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 7:05 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 5/12/2013 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> If your mom ate something different while pregnant with you, such that >>>> you >>>> developed with different atoms, does that mean someone else would have >>>> been >>>> born in your place and you wouldn't be conscious? Or if one unexpressed >>>> gene was different, would it be someone other than you looking through >>>> those >>>> eyes? What if one gene were different, but it was of little >>>> consequence, or >>>> what if multiple genes were different, etc. How much of the >>>> circumstances >>>> would have to change for you to never have been born? If you admit that >>>> different matter or different genes would not make it such that you were >>>> never born, then are you not all your siblings as well? >>>> >>>> >>>> That doesn't follow. The most common theory of why you are you is that >>>> the >>>> structure of your brain and body encode computations that are peculiar >>>> to >>>> you. You are determined by the structure that effects these >>>> computations. >>>> This is independent of the particular atoms and molecules and even a >>>> lot of >>>> the structure. As Bruno puts it, it depends on the level of >>>> substitution. >>>> Just because there is a level, e.g. atoms, that makes no difference, it >>>> doesn't follow that there is not a difference at another level. >>>> >>> It's hard to have this discussion with a single word for "you". 1p-you >>> and 3p-you might make it easier. The 3p-you is characterised by a >>> number of physical processes that we more or less understand. For >>> example, if I fall and lose a bit of skin from my knee that won't >>> change much, but there is possible a relatively small set of neurons >>> that can be changed to alter my personality. But the idea that the >>> 1p-you is determined at a substitution level seems silly to me >>> >> >> I said it was the most common theory. Not that it was right. >> Computationalism is the theory that there is no substitution level which >> doesn't instantiate you1 so long as the computation is the same. >> >> >> (unless >>> we can find some fundamental process by which the 1p arises). >>> Otherwise, I find it easier to believe that there is only one 1p >>> conscious entity that gets instantiated on everyone (and possible >>> everything), at all times, in all possible universes. >>> >> >> Even assuming computationalism there can be different computations and >> hence different 1p. As I understand Bruno's theory, consciousness is not >> an entity, it's described by a relation between threads of computation. >> >> Brent >> >> >> >>> Telmo. >>> >>> Brent >>>> >>> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
