I don't know. It would seem you would want to believe that if you were going to say "yes" to the doctor, since the doctor is relying functionalism to ensure the replacement works. But Bruno's UD computes all functions and he theorizes that 1p consciousness consists of a sequence of states in this computation, if I understand him correctly.

Brent


On 5/13/2013 10:39 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
We should add that computationalism postulates that consciousness is a process that can be exactly specified by a recursively enumerable function. No?


On Mon, May 13, 2013 at 1:16 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 5/13/2013 5:41 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

        On Sun, May 12, 2013 at 7:05 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net
        <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

            On 5/12/2013 9:00 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


            If your mom ate something different while pregnant with you, such 
that you
            developed with different atoms, does that mean someone else would 
have been
            born in your place and you wouldn't be conscious?  Or if one 
unexpressed
            gene was different, would it be someone other than you looking 
through those
            eyes?  What if one gene were different, but it was of little 
consequence, or
            what if multiple genes were different, etc.  How much of the 
circumstances
            would have to change for you to never have been born?  If you admit 
that
            different matter or different genes would not make it such that you 
were
            never born, then are you not all your siblings as well?


            That doesn't follow.  The most common theory of why you are you is 
that the
            structure of your brain and body encode computations that are 
peculiar to
            you.  You are determined by the structure that effects these 
computations.
            This is independent of the particular atoms and molecules and even 
a lot of
            the structure.  As Bruno puts it, it depends on the level of 
substitution.
            Just because there is a level, e.g. atoms, that makes no 
difference, it
            doesn't follow that there is not a difference at another level.

        It's hard to have this discussion with a single word for "you". 1p-you
        and 3p-you might make it easier. The 3p-you is characterised by a
        number of physical processes that we more or less understand. For
        example, if I fall and lose a bit of skin from my knee that won't
        change much, but there is possible a relatively small set of neurons
        that can be changed to alter my personality. But the idea that the
        1p-you is determined at a substitution level seems silly to me


    I said it was the most common theory.  Not that it was right. 
Computationalism is
    the theory that there is no substitution level which doesn't instantiate 
you1 so
    long as the computation is the same.


        (unless
        we can find some fundamental process by which the 1p arises).
        Otherwise, I find it easier to believe that there is only one 1p
        conscious entity that gets instantiated on everyone (and possible
        everything), at all times, in all possible universes.


    Even assuming computationalism there can be different computations and hence
    different 1p.  As I understand Bruno's theory, consciousness is not an 
entity, it's
    described by a relation between threads of computation.

    Brent



        Telmo.

            Brent


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