On 19 May 2013, at 21:54, Johnathan Corgan wrote:

On Sun, May 19, 2013 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

Feel free to ask more from this post, though. If you understand the FPI, the rest follows from logic and some passive theoretical computer science, I think.

Yes, I understand UDA 1-7 and the concept that first-person indeterminacy arises from the one's current state being the possible future state of an infinity of prior computational states (give the assumptions of the argument.) It's less clear to me how this would translate to an expectation value or measure on the space of possible future states from this one.

How could it be different? It follows from step 6 and 7. It does not mean that the measure exists, but that if comp is true, the measure has to exist, and will define what is the physical reality. Then the math (hypostases) explains why the measure seems already to exist, defines a quantum logic,




More to the point of my original comment, though, you frequently make statements about how it follows from this an explanation of quantum, qualia, matter, etc., using references to modal logic, Plotinus' theory of matter, the eight hypostases, and other very high-level concepts.

I guess I'm just having trouble connecting the dots in between.

It took me 30 years of math to get that. But I am giving the dots right now on the FOAR list (as I have done already on this list). The difficulty is in the work already done by Gödel, Löb, Solovay, relating provability to the G logic, the relation between provability and computability, etc. I suggest you look at the FOAR list, for not psuhing me to duplicate the informations, thanks.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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