On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/


A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't
exist even though their complete description is self-consistent.
Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate
'true' with 'exists'.  If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17
exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant
is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists?



Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant
can't exist.


A pink elephant is pink by construction.


Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me
a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink.

Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I
remember but am not experiencing this very moment? For example, I've
been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an
abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium.
That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being
pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No?


OK.

I should have said "By logic applied to our consensual reality". Then the difference is that in case someone tell you that Brussels doesn't exist, you can still give him some procideure to assess the fact, (with trains, planes or Goggle earth, for example), which is not the case for the "flying pig elephant", (with a consensual definition of what that can be).

In my opinion, "fictionalism" does not make sense. We just need to agree on what we need to assume at the start, and then be clear on what exist, in which sense which can be relative and differ from different views.

Assuming comp, I argued that we need to assume no more than 0 and the successors, and the terms x + y and x * y. The rest follows semantically (truth will "go" must farer than what any machine/number will ever been able to conceive publicly).

Eventually, the question is never does "flying pink elephant" exist, but what is the probability to experience the seeing of one, and what is the probability you can share that experience with others.

Pink elephants are the paradigmatic hallucination of the alcohol withdrawal. But I have never seen an explicit report on that, and besides, they are not "known" as being flying besides such hallucinations can't help to make them existing in the consensual local sense).

Then fictionalism can make sense only if we assume some basic physical existence, or reality, as the not explicit contrary of "fiction". It is Aristotelianism.

Elementary arithmetic seems conceptually simpler than any physical notion, and with comp I think there is not much choice in the matter (in all senses of the word).

A pair of two non null integers x y such that (x/y)^2 = 2, that is fiction.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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