# Re: Fictionalism!

Stephen, there is a problem with the format. Could you please to reformat it as it is impossible to reply to it. Thanks.
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I will answer asap, but probably not today.```
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best,

Bruno

On 09 Jun 2013, at 17:53, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Wrong Bruno, Flying pink elephants could be 'off mass shell', virtual elephants. Their color is a superposition of pink and not pink, which makes them, on average, colorless unless we look *very* carefully.
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Your test for 'reality' is unphysical because it assumes that *infinite computations that consume no resources* can be accessed for confirmation of &p.
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?
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p is for a true fact. It makes no sense to ask a confirmation, which applies only to a theory or a belief.
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And I was not proposing a test. Just doing the usal classical logician joke. I can give evidence that all flying elephant on this planet, in this branch of the wave are pink and not pink.
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[SPK] What is it that makes p "a true fact"? If we follow fictionalism, it is true if and only if none of those that can conceive of p have also a counterexample of p. This seems, crudely, to be a form of the law of excluded middle.
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The argument is simple: a proof of a sentence is equivalent to a computation of the model of the sentence.
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That does not make sense to me. Proof is model independent.
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[SPK] If a model of p does not exist, is a proof of p possible? I do not see how! My concept of a pink elephant is a model. The experience of my reading this sentence is a model. But I am thinking of model outside of the restricted definition of a model within math proper. As I see things, independence is not existential separability.
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```There there is a flaw in the premise of Arithmetic realism.
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because you beg the question by assume a physical reality, and thus non comp.
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[SPK] No, I accept that the physical reality that I experience is a construction as per COMP, it supervenes on many minds and is almost independent of any one of them (in the limit of infinitely many minds). AR assumes that reality is completely independent of minds and thus has a problem: it cannot explain how many minds can agree on the existence of a physical reality.
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Thus I present 'fictionalism' as a way to illustrate my counterexample to your claim of 'absolute truth' for Bp&p..
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Assuming Aristotle, so again it is not an argument for non validity, but a proposal for a different theory.
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[SPK] Yes, it is a different theory that does not necessarily contradict COMP. In my thinking COMP is too narrow a theory of minds. It only allows for a single mind.
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On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 3:21 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
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On 08 Jun 2013, at 15:56, Stephen Paul King wrote:

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Wrong Bruno, Flying pink elephants could be 'off mass shell', virtual elephants. Their color is a superposition of pink and not pink, which makes them, on average, colorless unless we look *very* carefully.
```
```
Your test for 'reality' is unphysical because it assumes that *infinite computations that consume no resources* can be accessed for confirmation of &p.
```
?
```
p is for a true fact. It makes no sense to ask a confirmation, which applies only to a theory or a belief.
```
```
And I was not proposing a test. Just doing the usal classical logician joke. I can give evidence that all flying elephant on this planet, in this branch of the wave are pink and not pink.
```

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The argument is simple: a proof of a sentence is equivalent to a computation of the model of the sentence.
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That does not make sense to me. Proof is model independent.

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```If the sentence is inconsistent, then the model cannot be generated.
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That makes sense!

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The *Reality* of p is the by-product of mutual agreement of all possible testers/provers/interviewers of p, not some transcendent *Being*.
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In Aristotle metaphysics, which is out the scope of my working hypothesis. You assume non-comp.
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```There there is a flaw in the premise of Arithmetic realism.
```
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because you beg the question by assume a physical reality, and thus non comp.
```

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Thus I present 'fictionalism' as a way to illustrate my counterexample to your claim of 'absolute truth' for Bp&p..
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Assuming Aristotle, so again it is not an argument for non validity, but a proposal for a different theory.
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Bruno

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On Sat, Jun 8, 2013 at 4:02 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
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On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote:

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```On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
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Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/
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A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self- consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists?
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Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist.
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Bruno

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```
Brent

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